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LEGAL DUTIES
CARLETON KEMP ALLEN0
BEYOND all the controverted questions of jurisprudence lies the
master-problem whether law exists for the sake of enlarging
or for the sake of restricting the liberty of man. The more one
watches the eternal game of battledore and shuttlecock on the
field of jurisprudential theory, the more one is aware that all
differences of view, reduce them to their true joinder of issue,
gravitate to that starting-point of inquiry. The problem is not
solved by such celebrated paradoxes as that of Cicero, "We are
the slaves of the law in order that we may be free," any more
than the elusive problem of personality, the relation between
"separateness" and "togetherness," is solved by the clihW that
we find ourselves by losing ourselves. Paradox merely gives
pointed expression to a puzzling matter of observation, without
attempting to explain it.
Akin to this problem is the question whether law is to be
regarded primarily as a system of rights or of duties; for legal
right, however we define it, must mean some enlargement, or
at least some guarantee, of individual freedom of action or of
enjoyment; while legal duty denotes some restriction, neces-
sitated by the interests of others, upon self-interest. Thering 1
described the "tlree fundamental aphorisms of objective law"
as: "I exist for myself; the world exists for me; I exist for
the world." Does law the better enable the individual to live
for himself in a world which exists for him, or the better en-
able him to live in a world for the sake of which he exists?
The conventional doctrines of jurisprudence return the an-
swer that every legal system is made up, and must be made
up, both of rights and duties, and that the two things are recip-
rocal constants. It is needless on this occasion to refer to the
different kinds of rights and duties which occupy the orthodox
classifications; our present concern is only with the familiar
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view that rights and duties are indissociable part and counter-
part of a wide va'riety of legal relationships. In the view of
some writers, it is of no moment which is to be regarded as
part and which as counterpart. Rights and duties are "but dif-
ferent aspects of the same rules and events," and for the pur-
poses of juristic analysis it makes no difference which aspect
we select for consideration, for to examine one is necessarily
to examine both. As Sir Frederick Pollock, who himself seems
-to regard law as primarily a system of duties, for he defines
rules of law as "the duties of subjects under the common au-
thority of the State," 2 observes:
"Duty and Right are not really more divisible in law than
action and reaction in mechanics. Hence it would seem that
such topics of discussion as whether a system of law should be
arranged under heads of duties or heads of rights are at best
,of secondary importance, and cannot lead to conclusions of any
universal validity. The practical lawyer's instinct is to regard
anxious dwelling on these topics with a certain impatience, an
impatience that may be said to border on contempt. If he is
pressed for reasons, and ventures to give them offhand, his
reasons are perhaps more likely to be bad than good. Yet reflec-
tion appears to show that in this as in many other cases the
practical instinct is in the-main justified, although it may be
long before the justification is made explicit in a form that will
satisfy philosophers. Experience builds better than it knows." I
Certain modern doctrines deliver bold challenge to this as-
sumption that right and duty are the constant, coexistent and
interdependent subject-matter of law. These theories go far
beyond the formal question of arrangement according to rights
or duties; they will not grant the initial postulate. I propose
to consider here two theories, one which holds that law consists
solely of duties, and another which holds that law consists
neither of rights nor of duties, but of-there I pause; for of
what it does consist, in the absence of both these elements, it
is not easy to see.
I
The first is the positivist doctrine of Duguit. It will be ap-
preciated that I am not now concerned with the whole of Du-
guit's extremely energetic and versatile teaching, but with that
-part of it-it is, of course, the philosophical or sociological
starting-point of his whole jurisprudence-which sets forth his
analysis of the true content of law.
4
2 POLLOCK, FiRST BooK OF JURISPRUDENCE (6th ed. 1929) 57.
3 Ibid. 73.
4 It is to be sought passim in his voluminous writings, but more particu-
larly in L'ETAT, LE DROrr OBJECrIF ET LA Loi PosiTivE (1901-1903);
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Men 'have often been influenced throughout their whole lives
by a suddenly-revealed notion contained in a single phrase.
Thus the whole current of Bentham's life was changed by light-
ing upon Priestley's formula: "The greatest happiness of the
greatest number." Some such influence seems to have been ex-
erted upon M. Duguit by a principle enunciated by Auguste
Comte and cited more than once 3 in Al. Duguit's writings:
"The decisive regeneration will consist above all in always
substituting duties for rights in order the better to subordinate
personality to sociability."
The idea of rights, it is contended, really proceeded from the
notion of supernatural will. In order to combat this theocratic
tyranny,
".... the metaphysics of the last five centuries introduced the
so-called human rights, which had only a negative function;
when it was attempted to attach to them any organic signifi-
cance, they soon displayed their anti-social character and always
tended to consecrate individuality. Every man has duties to-
wards all, but nobody has any right, properly so called. Nobody
possesses any right except the right of always doing his duty." 
This is the conclusion which Ai. Duguit adopts. Let us con-
sider the process of reasoning by which he arrives at it.
He rejects-rightly, as I believe-the absolutistic doctrine
that law originates solely with the State-i.e., the organized,
personified, sovereign State of traditional political theory. (He
repudiates altogether the personification of the State: the basis
of all government to him is simply the de facto power of the
stronger members of a community over the weaker.) Law orig-
inates, of necessity, with society itself. It is anterior and
superior to the State.
Next, he attacks the individualistic conception of natural
rights. Rights by nature mean nothing. It is impossible to
conceive man as anything else than a social creature, involved
in an inescapable plexus of relationships with his fellows. These
relationships, Duguit holds, are never of rights, but always of
duties. The individualist doctrine rests upon the theory of the
essential equality of men, which is mere fiction. In reality, the
only law which governs the individual is the social law. This
is the law of social solidarity, arising from two "constant and
irreducible elements in society: (1) that men have certain so-
MANIEL m DRorr CONSTrrTmON'EL (3d ed. 1918) Intro. and c. I; TRAirr
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cial needs which they can satisfy only by common effort; (2)
that they have certain different needs and different aptitudes,
which they can satisfy only by exchange and by division of
labour" 7 (solidcritg par* similitudes and solidaritM par division
&u travail). This transcendent principle governs all the rela-
tions of men in society:
"Consequently a rule of conduct imposes itself on social man
by the very nature of things,.a rule which may be formulated
thus: to do nothing which is prejudicial to social solidarity
under either of its two forms and to do everything which tends
to realize and develop, social solidarity, mechanical and organ-
ical. The whole of objective law is summed up in this formula,
and positive law pour 6tre l6gitime [a phrase which I find it
difficult to translate without seeming to attribute to its author
a viciously circular argument] must be the expression, the de-
velopment or the putting into practice of this principle."
This rule is both social and individual: social, because the
whole existence of society depends on it; individual, because it
exists in the individual conscience. "The rule is individual also
in that it applies and can only apply to individuals; a rule of
conduct can impose itself only on beings possessed of a con-
science and a will." 9
The law of social solidarity is not a constant. It chatiges with
changing conditions:
"The rule of law, as I conceive it, is not an ideal and absolute
rule, to which men should strive to approximate more and more
every day; it is a variable and changing rule; and the function
of the jurisconsult is to determine what rule of law adapts it-
self exactly to the structure of any given society." 10
Hence its difference from "natural" law.
This being droit objectif, droit subjectif is only a fulfilment
of the same purpose. Man has droits: 21 but they are only
powers to do his duty. "They are powers which belong to him
because, being social, he has a social duty to fulfil, and he ought
to have the right to fulfil his duty."
Individual liberty, then, is only liberty to develop as com-
pletely as possible one's own activity for the sake of solidarity.
It is liberty to perform one's social duty.
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"The aim of political power is to realize le droit; it is obliged
by le droit to do all that lies in its power to assure the reign of
droit. The State is founded on force; but this force is legitimate
[only] when it is exercised in conformity with droit . . . It
is political power placed at the service of droit." 12
The fundamental weakness of this new "objective law" is
that it substitutes for the dogmatism of the individualistic
school another form of dogmatism equally irbitrary. Duguit's
"law" of social solidarity, on examination, turns out to be a
commonplace parading under an imposing title. Assuredly
man is social, and so are his legal rights; a society-any society,
the most primitive as well as the most complex---cannot exist
unless there is some co-operation for common aims and some
economic exchange and division of labor. But these are simply
manifest facts of existence; it is only by metaphor that they
can be called a "law." This seems to be admitted by Duguit
when he tells us again and again that the governing factor in
law is an "objective situation:" in other words, it is a state of
facts which gives rise to the necessity for exercising the sense
of rightness and usefulness in principles of conduct; and, on
Duguit's own showing, that sense of rightness and usefulness
can proceed, in the last analysis, only from the individual intel-
ligence and conscience. Thus the existence of this supposed
transcendent "law" does not in any way relieve us of the prob-
lems of right and wrong, justice and injustice, which from time
immemorial have been the battleground of philosophical juris-
prudence. The Law of Nature did at least claim to supply
authoritative solution of these ardpwi; Duguits supreme law
seems to leave us in exactly the same state of doubt and diffi-
culty with which we began.
For how is the individual, loyally striving to do his duty to
society, to know the law to which his actions should conform?
How does it manifest itself? Clearly not through positive law;
for it is part of Duguit's theory that positive law is not neces-
sarily the expression of the common will or the "social con-
science," but merely of those persons who happen, for the time
being, to be the de facto governors of any particular society.
It seems, then, that it must be, like the Law of Nature, "written
in men's hearts." But much experience in the past has shon
that hearts are a highly unreliable form of writing material,
and that the script upon them is sometimes illegible. We are
back again, then, at the old problem of the authority of positive
law, and we have not advanced towards the solution of it by





It is just as much a fallacy to call the principle of social
solidarity an "objective law" as it was to describe the Law of
Nature as an "objective law." It certainly expresses a manifest
fact of social co-existence; but if it is to serve Duguit's pur-
pose as a law of superldtive authority, it must mean some ulti-
mate and absolute principle of truth by which these two ele-
ments of social co-existence are to be infallibly regulated. There
is no such ultimate.and absolute principle of truth. The factors
which influence co-operative effort and division of labor must
vary greatly with times, places and societies. The law of social
solidarity was one thing for Greece and Rome, another thing for
modern states which are not based on slave labor; it is one thing
for the England, and another thing for the Russia, of today; it
is one thing for the France of M. Duguit, another thing for the
Italy of Signor Mussolini. What, then, becomes of our "law"?
It cannot be anything more than a belief as to the best means
of furthering, in a given society, certain economic principles
which are supposed to be advantageous. Just as the "natural
law with variable content" of Stammler's school ceases to be a
law at all, so a law of social solidarity with variable content
ceases to be a law at all. And just as a natural law with vari-
able content, expressed in plain language, seems to mean only
that law should be as morally just as possible according to the
most enlightened opinion of the day, so a law of social solidarity
with variable content seems to mean only that law should be
as socially expedient as possible according to the most enlight-
ened opinion of the day-if that be discoverable. In the up-
shot, therefore, Duguit is only aiming at what the sociological
school of jurisprudence set before themselves with, as it seems
to me, less a prio7i assumption and a more pragmatic sense of
the nature of their task.
Even admitting the supremacy of the principle of social soli-
darity, it is difficult to see why its corollary should be the tyr-
anny of duties, to the exclusion of all rights. It is certain
that a man cannot live solely for himself; it is equally certain
that he cannot live solely for others. The very notion is a
negation of personality. Duguit's charge against the individ-
ualistic school is that they represented everything-society and
all else-as existing solely for the self-realization of the indi-
vidual. That is not quite just to eighteenth-century doctrines:
it is not, for example, consistent with Kant's categorical im-
perative, according to which the "freedom of all" is the ultimate
aim of all individual morality. But let us concede for the mo-
ment that philosophical individualists did often exaggerate the
importance of ego in the scheme of things, just as the nine-
teenth-century political individualists did often exaggerate the
sanctity of individual right' and freedom as against the general
[Vol. 40
LEGAL DUTIES
good of the majority. Is it not equally an exaggeration to rep-
resent the individual as utterly subordinate to the general good
of the majority? Be the claims of others what they will, self
and self-interest must be to every creature the initial data of
his very existence. Before he can live at all, whether for him-
self or for others, a man must have some security for existence
and for self-development in relation to others who are all de-
manding the same security. We need not confuse the issue by
calling this a "natural" right. We need only say that human
nature needs it and will insist on having it, either by the strong
arm or by the arm of the law; and this security it obtains by
means of rights, whether they be automatically acquired by the
mpre fact of being a human person born alive in an ordered
society (the so-called "rights of personality") or specifically
acquired by separate acts of bargain or grant or claim for
wrongful injury. Nor is it only personal security, but the en-
joyment of goods, to the exclusion of others, which the individ-
ual desires and demands by means of legal rights. Property is
no doubt largely a social institution as well as an individual
sphere of advantage. The conception of dominium as an abso-
lutely unrestricted right utendi, fruendi et abntendi is impos-
sible under modern conditions; I doubt whether it has ever been
possible, except in theory, under the conditions of any civilized
society: it certainly was not so in Rome. In innumerable di-
rections property is limited by social requirements. And yet
there is something little short of pleasantry in the notion of an
owner using and enjoying property solely out of a sense of duty
to the law of social solidarity. He holds, intends if necessary
to assert, and is permitted to assert., a claim to personal enjoy-
ment, subject to the necessary limitations of social solidarity-
i.e., in simpler terms, subject to the similar legitimate claims
of others. This legal situation would not be altered even if
the institution of private property were altogether abolished.
Even under a system of State or communistic proprietorship,
the individual -would still have his assigned sphere of enjoy-
ment and advantage, in which he would and must have legal sup-
port in vindicating it against infringement.
Some realization of right-not only the right, but my right-
is a postulate, and the first postulate of personality; and it is
therefore not a matter of indifference whether we approach law
as primarily a sysiem of rights or of duties. It is impossible
to escape what Sir Paul Vinogradoff has called 23 "the ultimate
and irreducible atom" of the human, individual will. The stark
asceticism of the Kantian principle which would regard duty
as the sole measure of the moral value of acts-however gener-
13 2 VNoGRAnOFF, COLLECTED PAPERS (1928) 373.
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ous, however benevolent, however healthily pleasurable they
may be-is repellent to normal instinct. Duty, it has been
said, means "devotion to the various kinds of good in proportion
to their relative value and importance." "At bottom the sense
of duty is the due appreciation of the proportionate objective
value of ends."" Self-abnegation for the sake of the majority
is not the only human good, nor the only end which has objec-
tive value. Indeed, there are many circumstances in which
self-abnegation is not only not a good, but is a positive evil.
It may be a form of mere weakness, and not infrequently it is
a form of self-indulgence. There is only one human being more
tedious than the person who is for ever standing on his rights,
and that is the person who is for ever standing on his duties.
I seem to remember a character of that kind in one of Ibsen's
plays, and a very disagreeable, mischief-making woman she
was. It is depressing to contemplate a society composed en-
tirely of such persons. It is our duty to let live, but it is our
right to live, and M. Duguit hardly satisfies us when he tells
us that we shall live the more abundantly by merely letting live.
Nor does duty as the sole principle of conduct become any
more attractive when it is owed not to individuals, but to the
community. In a great deal of current theory there is a curious
superstition concerning the peculiar virtue of what I may call
mere mass. It seems to be thought that there Is some self-
sufficient sanctity in mere plurality for its own sake. An ag-
gregate of individuals associated for a common purpose is to
have the full rights and duties of legal personality merely by
virtue of being an aggregate-simply because, in Maitland's
phrase, it "behaves like a corporation." 1 , It is apparently more
important that it should behave like a corporation than that it
should behave itself. It does not seem to be contemplated as
a possibility that the phenomenon of an indefinite number of
groups and septs behaving like corporations may become a
great social pest, not to say an intolerable tyranny over what
little is left-of separate individual life. Similarly a social ag-
gregate, a community, is to be a supreme law unto itself and a
supreme authority over the individual conscience simply be-
cause it is an aggregate co-operating for certain ends. There
is no merit in co-operation and solidarity per se: everything
depends on the end to which co-operation and solidarity are di-
rected. But solidarity in and of itself seems to constitute an
irrefragable norm for Duguit: it seems to be of no interest to
him to inquire into its purport. Imagine-and recent histoi'y
makes the effort of imagination not excessively difficult-a com-
14 1 RASHDALL, THEORY OF GOOD AND EVIL (2d ed. 1924) 125, 128.




munity, full of social and patriotic vitality, whose vigorous co-
operative effort is largely directed towards military self-asser-
tion. Imagine-and again modem history provides ready
examples-a community in which an enormous amount of co-
operative vitality is directed primarily to the increase of material
wealth, prosperity and mechanization far beyond the reasonable
needs of human nature. Are these types of social co-operation
to be the sovereign guides of conduct for the individual? It
may well be that he finds himself in such a situation that he
cannot conscientiously associate in the collective activities of
the society in which he happens to be placed. The communist
in a capitalistic society, or the capitalist in a communistic so-
ciety, is at issue with the whole conception of solidarity, par
similitudes and par division du travail, which surrounds him.
I do not know by what right we can say that the social solidarity
of which he disapproves is the unchallengeable measure of his
duty. Beyond doubt, the State has the power to say: "I tell
you that it is your duty to do thus and thus, and if you do not
happen to conceive it as a duty, you must nevertheless pay the
penalty for non-compliance. If you do not concur in what com-
mends itself to the majority, you will yield to the compulsion
of the majority." To that ancient dilemma between sovereign
command and individual conscience I will revert in another con-
nection. But Duguits doctrine goes far beyond the bare power
of the State to exact obedience and the coercion of the individ-
ual into law-abidingness. He offers us a transcendent, unexcep-
tionable sanction for the "legitimacy" of all law and the inherent
obligatory force of all legal duty. Whatever is, socially and by
force of solidary effort, is right, and constitutes itself for the
individual one great, unquestionable ought. It is from this
point of view that his philosophy seems to me to be insufficient;
and history would be the poorer if there had not been found, in
all ages, individuals who took the contrary view.
Finally, what meaning is to be attached to the aphorism of
Comte and Duguit that a man has only one right, namely, the
"right to do his duty"? It has the air of somewhat light-
hearted epigram; but in reality it constitutes an admission of
more damaging import than its authors seem to realize. For
consider the practical operation of this one little orphan right
which the positivists vouchsafe us. As a loyal citizen, I am
about to do my duty to social solidarity; let us say that I pro-
pose to do it by the singular method of enjoying the benefit of
the property which I have acquired by my labour. Somebody
attempts to prevent this meritorious effort, by physical con-
straint or other illegal means. I have, it seems, a right to repel
the interference and even (we must assume) to obtain compen-
sation for it-perhaps even to cause it to be punished crimi-
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nally. Why? Because it is in the interests of society that I
should not be prevented from doing my duty to my fellows?
.Or because I am entitled to demand of the law that minimum of
personal freedom of action, thought, speech and enjoyment with-
out which my life would be savourless and purposeless? I can-
not think that many persons will doubt which is the truer of
these two answers. Once we admit that least common denomi-
nator of right, the, ground is cut away from the conception of
law as duty, whole duty and nothing but duty. To say that a
man has no right except to do his duty is to mean either (if
we are dealing in mere oxymoron) that he has no right at all,
or else that he has a claim at least to that minimum of guar-
anteed freedom which, as it seems to me, is the starting-point
of all legal systems and which is an obstacle on the threshold
of an exclusively "deontological" view of law. We are brought
back to the "ultimate and irreducible atom;" and the "law" of
social solidarity, shorn of its dogmatism, means only from the
social point of view that the interest of each must be adjusted
to the interest of all. From the individual point of view, it
means that every man in the enjoyment and assertion of his
right should be conscious of a duty to his fellows for the sake
of such harmony and. development of society as he believes to
be for ultimate good-a good which he furthers not only because
it is intrinsically good, but because he himself is one of the joint
beneficiaries in it.
II
The second theory to which I invite attention is that of Pro-
fessor Lundstedt of Uppsala. It is proper to say that my ob-
servations are limited to one only of Professor Lundstedt's
books, 6 which is written in English; for the remainder of his
numerous monographs are written in Swedish, which unhappily
I do not read. I hope it is not unfair, however, to take this one
book as a text, since it is offered as an epitome of Professor
Lundstedt's teaching, which in its turn has been inspired by
the theories of Professor Hiigerstr~m of Uppsala.
Since Professor Lundstedt is delivering a frontal attack upon
some of the most strongly fortified positions of jurisprudence,
he may be pardoned a certain degree of enthusiastic, offensive
spirit; but it is a pity that much of his missionary zeal takes the
form of violent contempt for any doctrines in which he does not
happen to concur.
Lundstedt would banish utterly from the sphere of law the
conceptions both of subjective right and of subjective duty.




Both, he holds, are unnecessary and irreconcilable with the facts.
In its briefest terms, his thesis is that rules of law arise from
one source only-namely, sheer necessity for order, security and
self-preservation in society, which necessities are totally uncon-
nected in their inception with any moral notions whatever; and
that the maintenance, over a long period of time, of these rules
which have been dictated by naked physical necessity, gives rise
in due season to the Rechitsgefiiht which we call the sense of
right and duty, the perception of just and unjust.
Thus criminal law is based solely on self-preservation and the
prevention of social disruption, not upon any principle of jus-
tice. Punishment is not deterrent in the sense that it inspires
fear in the wrongdoer: its usefulness is to create a sense of
duty or a moral instinct, in regard to crime, which is "the con-
sequence of the administration of the criminal law through gen-
erations."
The same reasoning is applied to civil liability. The principle
that restitution must be made for wrongful damage does not
rest upon any "common sense of justice" but is merely another
product of self-preservation---"it is absolutely necessary to the
existence of the community." "That the sum of money is to be
paid to the injured person, and that it is estimated in accord-
ance with the extent of the damage and not on any other basis,
depends, of course, upon the fact that the interest of the com-
munity in preventing careless acts is, on close inspection, simply
the interest in creating an order of society in which every citizen
may live in security as regards damages for injury due to care-
lessness on the part of others." 17 The argument here proceeds
in this manner: the "culpa-rule"-i.e., the principle that imputa-
bility is to be determined by blameworthiness-arose from sheer
social necessity; the maintenance of the rule in the concrete
engendered a feeling of justice in the abstract; hence it was
falsely supposed-reversing what Lundstedt conceives to be the
true order of development-that the post koc was the propter
hoc, or, in other words, that the rules of civil liability sprang
from and must always be based upon a principle of justice.
Consequently a vast amount of misdirected ingenuity has been
expended in trying to reconcile with the culpa-rule those cases
of so-called "absolute" liability which cannot logically be re-
lated to blameworthiness, and which become increasingly com-
mon in the conditions of modern society. So also with vicarious
liability, according to which a man may be liable for an under-
ling's wrong for which he is in no sense to blame. These forms
of liability, it is urged, have no relation to justice or injustice,
right or duty, lawfulness or unlawfulness: they are based
IT Ibid.
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solely on expediency, and the principle of expediency is that
the knowledge of the liability of the harm-doer increases the
general sense of security by deterring harmful acts.
Again, it is argued that the law of contract is based not upon
any notion of good faith or of the validity of promises, but
simply upon the social necessity that undertakings for the ex-
change of valuable interests must be binding. The notion of
obligation here is posterior to that of economic usefulness. "It
is the maintenance of the Law of Contract during centuries that
has made the phrase 'agreements must be kept' appear in the
public conscience as something valid in itself." 18 The whole
essence of promise is simply liability to damages for breach, an
idea already familiarized by Holmes 19 and repeatedly contro-
verted. There is no question of rights and duties either here
or in torts. The whole legal situation is summed up in the simple
fact that- if one party does not perform his contract, or if he
causes harm to another, he "runs the risk of certain reactions
detrimental to him." Apparently the "wrongfulness" of acts in
law consists solely in the operation of these "reactions."
In what he calls "political law," Lundstedt scouts the notion
that the rule of law and the force of the State rest upon any-
thing in the nature of "common consent." The State again is
simply a creature of necessity: it is only a form of organization
which is requisite for co-existence. "It is through the commu-
nity, and thus through law, that man has become a rational, and
thus a judging and deciding being." 20
In sum, law exists solely to lrevent harm which is detrimental
to the community; or, to put the proposition more positively, it
exists only to confer social benefit. This is Lundstedt's con-
ception of the meaning of legal right:
"When using the idea of right in science with a scientific sig-
nificance, we must try to realize that all these conceptions which
make people talk of right as belonging to a person . . . and
search for its object, pertain to ideas of non-existent things. We
must try to understand that in reality 'right' is purely an ab-
stract expression, a mere form, for actual situations in which,
on account of certain rules maintained by force, certain acts.
give rise t6 certain effects. Broadly speaking, the position is
as follows. If, in the situations under discussion, a person does
not observe a certain legal rule in his relations to another per-
son, the consequence may be that that other person will initiate
certain State-proceedings to be carried out by force, either with
respect to the former's person (punishment) or property (par-
ticular liability to damages). Partly through their detrimental
effects, and partly by their irresistibility and certain character,
these forcible proceedings exert a general psychological pres-
18 Ibid.
11 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881) Lect. VIII.
2o LuNDSTEDT, Op. cit. supra note 16.
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sure on a, vwn to act in such situationzs in accordaitce with the
rude. In reality this is what one means judicially by 'right' and
'duty'. As a matter of fact, 'right' is nothing but an actual sit-
uation characterized by the regular absence of certain acts on the
part of outsiders, which absence in its turn is due to the opera-
tion of laws consistently maintained. Taking this into consid-
eration, one immediately understands that all talk of the 'holder
or the 'object' of a right is a logical impossibility: what is solely
an actual situation, and nothing else, cannot logically have either
subject or object." 21
It follows that the bulk of traditional jurisprudence is founded
on radical fallacies, or "phantoms."
The first observation to be made about Lundstedt's account
of the growth of legal rules is that it rests upon historical as-
sumptions which lack all substantiation. All pictures of the
consciousness of prehistoric man are to be distrusted: in the
past they have been the source of much mischievous "a-prior-
ism." Lundstedt's conception of the origin of law is very much
the same as that of Hobbes-an expedient of self-preservation
devised under sheer compulsion of circumstances by a naturally
predatory society. To him, as to Hobbes, Necessity, far from
"knowing no law," is the fount and origin of all law. It may
be so; for my own part, I decline to enter into speculation as
to the habits of thought and action of prehistoric man; it may
be a stimulating exercise for the imagination, but nobody has
ever known it to produce anything but more or less entertaining
fantasy. W"hat seems tolerably well established is that in the
earliest reliable records of primitive societies, law, so far from
being based on mere expediency, seems to be governed by the
very definite and powerful notions of gilt. Wigmore, writing
of the history of liability for injury, and supporting his thesis
by examples from many different systems of early law, has em-
phasized "the primitive notion which instinctively visits liabil-
ity on the visible offending source, whatever it be, of a visible
evil result."22 This well-established element of ancient law
has been supposed-dubiously, as it seems to me-to imply a
rule of mere automatic compensation for damage done, irrespec-
tive of wrongfulness-a principle expressed by some writers on
the early history of our own law of torts by the highly mislead-
ing maxim that "a man acts at his peril." In reality this "vis-
21 Ibid. The italics, in profusion of which Professor Lundstedt has no
rival, except possibly the late Queen Victoria, are as in the original.
22 Responsibility for Tortious Acts, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMER-
cAN LEGAL HISTORY (1909) 474, 483. For a further discussion, of much
interest even to modern theories of liability, of the "sacral element in an-
cient criminal law," see 2 POLLOCK & BIAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
C2d ed. 1899) 474.
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ible source of a visible evil result" is, as Wignore says, an
offending source of harm: a guilty responsibility is attributed to,
it; and it is well-known that this responsibility was imputed,,
at all events when blood had been shed, even to dumb animals
and to inanimate objects. The ox which gored a man to death
was to be condemned, that the blood-curse might be expiated; 23,
sticks and stones which broke bones received the solemn judg-
ment of a tribunal-e.g. the kings of the city and the tribes in
Attic law.24 Such instruments of evil-let alone human agents.
of harm and loss-were themselves, in some mysterious way,
evil; at the very best, however apparently incapable of wicked:
intent, they were the tools of dark, unpropitious forces which
were to be feared and, if expiation could accomplish it, placated.,
It seems to have been only by degrees that there grew up a.
consciousness that damage might occur by pure misadventure
without any question of imputability. Whatever rationalistic
notions of social expediency Lundstedt may suppose "man in
a state of nature" to have possessed, the very different notion
of sinful guilt seems to have been deeply rooted in legal institu-
tions when we first begin to obtain trustworthy accounts of
them. "The conception of offence against God," wrote Maine,
"produced the first class of ordinances,; the conception of offence
against one's neighbour produced the second; but the idea of
offence against the State or aggregate community did not at first
produce a true criminal jurisprudence." 2
It need hardly be said that Lundstedt's standpoint is, in the
extreme degree, positivist, and it is chiefly for that reason that
2 8 GENESIS ix, 5 and ExoDus xxi, 28. In English law, the animal or thing
which caused injury was a bane, and was undoubtedly considered (e.g., by
Bracton) as a real and culpable malefactor. Compare POLLOK & MAIT-
LAND, op. cit. supra note 22, at 472: "Ancient law will sometimes put the
beast to death, and will not be quite certain that it is not inflicting punish-
ment upon one who has deserved it. But the most startling illustrations
of its rigour occur when we see a man held liable for the evil done by his
lifeless chattels, for example, by his sword. If his sword kills, he will
have great difficulty in swearing that he did nothing whereby the dead
man was 'further from life or nearer to death.' If you hand over your
sword to a smith to be sharpened, see that you get it back 'sound,' that
is to say, with no blood-guiltiness attaching to it, for otherwise you may
be receiving a 'bane,' a slayer, into your house. But let us hear the en-
lightened Bracton on this matter, for old popular phrases will sometimes
crop up through his rational text. 'If a man by misadventure is crushed
or drowned or otherwise slain, let hue and cry at once be raised; but in
such a case there is no need to make pursuit from field to field and vill
to vill; for the malefactor has been caught, to wit, the bane.' Yes, the
malefactor, the bana, the slayer, has been caught; a cart, a boat, a mill-
wheel is the slayer and must now be devoted to God." As to the deodand,,
see Ibid. 474; 3 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1883) 77.
24 See 2 VINOGRADOFF, HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE (1920) 185.
25 MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861) 360.
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I am considering him in connection with Duguit, though, as I
shall presently mention, he strenuously endeavors to dissociate
himself from Duguit's position. All ethical notions, in his view,
zare the result o£ experience and of experience alone; law-an
"objective situation," a fact-engenders law-abidingness--a
-moral sentiment. There is here a profound fallacy, one which
hias always been the vulnerable point of positivism as a system of
-philosophy and has withheld from it any general acceptance. A
-moral principle does not cease to be moral merely because it is
necessary. On the contrary, all moral principles are, in a sense,
mecessities of existence. Doubtless there are abnormal, a-moral
individuals, though it is questionable whether there are any en-
tirely a-moral, sane individuals; but it is clear that life without
any moral criterion is at the best a miserable business, "nasty,
-brutish and short." The recognition of the necessity for some
Idnd of compromise between egoism and altruism itself proceeds
from a moral impulse or intuition, which cannot be acquired by
-mere empiricism. What led Lundstedt's homzo sapicns to recog-
-nize that punishment of the criminal enemy of society, the com-
-pensation of the injured plaintiff, the fulfilment of agreements,
the organization of society as a State, were "necessary"? Surely
-some consciousness that they were good and desirable. What
led Hobbes' nasty, brutish men-wolves ravening upon each
-other (which, by the way, is not the habit of the best-regulated
packs of wolves) -to enter into their remarkable contract of
compromise? Surely some very definite appreciation of the
goodness and the desirability of peace, security, "the pursuit of
happiness" and the efficacy of mutual promises-indeed, as has
constantly been pointed out, a far more definite and articulate
appreciation of these things than can be ascribed, with any de-
gree of probability, to Hobbes' mythical savage. It is quite il-
lusory to attribute all the elements of ancient law-which often
was a highly complicated system-solely to the instinct of self-
preservation; and even if this were possible, the very impulse
of self-preservation is not unconnected with moral perceptions.
No doubt it and its converse, self-reproduction, are the most
instinctive of all instinctive things; but it takes very different
forms in man and in the brutes. We speak of "animal courage"
as if it were always admirable; often it is not so. The beast
of prey, in the pursuit of immediate sensual satisfactions, such
as food or sex, is reckless of its life-less solicitous, in other
words, to preserve it-in a degree which would be reprehensible
in man. Alen, with every step that they advance from the beasts
of the field, desire to preserve their lives for the sake of things
which are worth living for: and that can only mean the develop-
ment of a qualitative moral discernment. In short, to posit the
adoption of the discipline of law without presupposing some
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moral perception of its intrinsic worth is a gross and palpable
hysteron proteron. Lundstedt puts it in the form that "the 'na-
ture of man as a rational and social being' is so far from being
the basis of law that, on the contrary, it is the consequence of
the operation of law." 26 1 borrow again a pregnant sentence
from Dr. Rashdall: "No accumulation of observed sequences,
no experience of what is, no predictions of what wil be, can
possibly prove what ought to be." 
27
Lundstedt himself cannot escape from some ethical criterion
-or, at least, in attempting to escape from it, he merely stulti-
fies himself. He vehemently dissents from utilitarianism upon
the usual ground of objection to that theory-namely, that by
an unwarrantable assumption it erects the greatest good of the
greatest number into the position of a law absolutely and objec-
tively valid in itself. Lundstedt repudiates any such question-
begging term as "happiness ;" law, he says, exists not to further
anything so subjective in conception as happiness, but simply
to promote objects "which indisputably man actually strives
to attain." The one guiding principle, as with Duguit, is the
"benefit of the community." But how is this an escape from
the utilitarian position? Why is "benefit" any less question-
begging than "happiness"? What are these indisputable, these
self-evident objects of human effort and aspiration? To this
question Lundstedt returns the entirely evasive answer: Is there
a single one of the legal purposes mentioned by me which any-
body will deny is manifestly for the benefit of the community?
His examples are the prevention of crimes of violence and fraud
by criminal law, the prevention of unjustifiable harm by the
law of torts, the enforcement of promises by pecuniary damages
-in short, order and security achieved by the threat of penalty.
His law, like that of Bentham and Austin, consists solely of
deterrent force. He entirely ignores the fact that a very great
deal of law does not consist at all of this minatory compulsion,
but of systematic adjustment of genuine doubts and difficulties
concerning the exact attribution of legal rights; that large por-
tions of law are simply the formulation of method; that no small
part of legal contention is, to borrow a happy phrase, "not the
struggle of right against wrong, but of right against right." The
safeguarding of the bare necessities of social and private exist-
ence plainly are not the sole subject-matter of modern law. There
are many matters in which it is far more difficult than Lundstedt
perceives to determine what is an "indisputable," "self-evident"
benefit to the community. Most of us nowadays, I imagine,
would agree that some measure of regulation of public health
2
6 LUNDSTEDT, op. cit. sUpra note 16.
27 Op. cit. supra note 14, at 53.
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is a necessary and obvious benefit to the community; it is not
so long since Herbert Spencer was arguing, with the utmost con-
viction-and he does not lack disciples even today-that it was
better for many to die of smallpox and slummery than for a
single individual to be protected compulsorily against these evils.
Cheap and widespread education has within the last century
come to be a generally unquestioned function of State organiza-
tion; there are those who greatly doubt its usefulness. Some
measure of military organization has, up to the present, been
the first care of every State which wished to survive; there are
many nowadays who hold that the time-honored method of
willing peace by preparing for war is the most dubious of all
benefits to the community. On none of these questions am I now
venturing a personal opinion; I am merely pointing out that it
is impossible to be doctrinaire about "indisputable" and "self-
evident benefit" as the automatic generating-plant of all law.
Law is established by no such mechanical means; it results from
a belief, right or wrong, in what is good and beneficial for the
individual and for society; and that belief presupposes the oper-
ation of moral and rational judgment. The Utilitarians set up
a standard which proved to be far more incalculable than they
supposed; but that is at least better than adopting a standard of
"benefit"-itself a qualitative term-and then denying that it
involves any qualitative considerations whatever.
The same inconsistency appears in Lundstedt's criticism of
Duguit. He rightly dissents from Duguit's hypothesis of the
so-called "law" of social solidarity, holding that it suffers from
the same arbitrariness of hypothesis as the Law of Nature. Yet
Lundstedt's own conception of the genesis of the operation of
law in society differs in no essential respect from Duguit's. To
him, as to Duguit, law is an "objective situation :" and his prin-
ciple of Necessity imposed by the conditions of co-existence is
indistinguishable from the requirements of co-existence to which
Duguit gives the name solidarity, except that while Lundstedt
vaguely speaks only of self-preservation, Duguit attempts, with
more precision, to distinguish the two primary Necessities as
co-operation and division of labor. Lundstedt repudiates, how-
ever, Duguit's doctrine that the supreme law imposes a duty
on the individual, and that this duty is the whole content of
"subjective" law. I have given reasons for thinking that doc-
trine inadequate; but it ought not, if he were consistent, to be
in the least incompatible with Lundstedt's theory. If the sheer
physical necessities of co-existence are the sole origin of law,
how is it possible to escape duty? Law, in this view, is in no
sense a positive delimitation of spheres of right: it is purely
defensive, negative, a declaration of what the individual must
not do, lest he threaten the security and the life of society:
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in short, a code of "ought not." The "ought not" is inevitable
and all-pervading; and the moment it is introduced, we are in
the realm of duty. Lundstedt's scheme of law is nothing but
a conglomerate of negative duties, enforced by punitive or resti-
tutory sanctions; and it differs from Duguit's only in this re-
spect, that the latter, much more plausibly, recognizes that there
are also a large number of positive powers or capacities in the
individual. These-questionably, as I have suggested-Duguit
refuses to recognize as rights, and considers as "rights to do
one's duty;" but in admitting their existence, he at least takes
a less limited view of the nature of legal rules than Lundstedt.
Finally, a good deal of Lundstedt's argumentation seems to
be unhelpful even of his own case. Whether or not law arose
from the mere animal instinct of self-preservation, or was
prompted by some rudimentary moral sense-and these ques-
tions, as I have suggested, require far closer historical examina-
tion than Lundstedt bestows upon them-the fact remains, on
this jurist's own showing, that a spirit of law-abidingness and
a sense of the distinction between rightfulness and wrongful-
ness have in fa&t come into existence in the course of time. Why,
then, social man being what he is, are we called upon to banish
the notions of right and duty, of lawfulness and unlawfulness,
from legal conceptions? Whencesoever and howsoever these,
sentiments may have originated, they have admittedly arrived,
presumably they are likely to stay, and it is a little difficult to,
understand why we must disregard them in the systems of law
with which we have nowadays to deal.
What seems to have led Lundstedt into this contradiction is
his anxiety to combat the doctrine that all law, in modern so-
ciety, must necessarily exist in order to satisfy moral demands,
and that it is incumbent upon jurisprudence to find for every
legal rule some ethical raison d'gtre. Now here there seems to,
be much force in the argument. There has undoubtedly been
a tendency in a certain type of idealistic philosophical juris-
prudence to see, or to imagine, in every positive law an emana-
tion or reflex of some greater moral law, of the kind typified
most conspicuously in history by the Law of Nature. This
process of moralization, carried into every department of mod-
ern law, is both needless and misconceived. It is impossible to
regard all contemporary law as resting upon a moral basis.
Much of it has become purely administrative, functional and
economic. No stretch of imagination can discover an ethical
origin for purely fiscal laws (to take only one example) : and
these form no small part of modern legal systems, as anybody




But the undeniable fact that large portions of law cannot,
without fantasy, be judged by purely ethical standards, and that
some laws (though not all, as Lundstedt would have us believe)
are inspired simply by exigencies of utility and the desire for
systematic method-this fact does not in any sense expel duty
from the sphere of law. Let us suppose that the State issues
a direct command or prohibition prompted not by any ethical,
but by purely economic, considerations. It commands me, for
example, to pay a tax upon the cigars which I am bringing into
England, and it prohibits me altogether from bringing my
Tauchnitz novel into England. Here is a direct injunction the
motive for which is simply economic; what is the nature of my
duty in such circumstances? Lundstedt maintains that it is a
moral duty, or it is nothing; he rightly declines to attach to
the term "legal duty" a purely objective meaning; for, as he
urges, duty cannot in any true sense be objective-it can oper-
ate upon nothing but the subjective conscience. Does a prob-
lem of conscience arise out of legal commands and prohibitions
which are of merely economic or administrative genesis? I
think it does.
We may assume that the great majority of men obey the
law without any nice inquiry into its justification either in
ethics or in expediency. They obey partly, no doubt, because
they fear the penalties of disobedience, but principally because
by long habit they believe it to be right-to be their duty-to
obey the law because it is the law. To take a former example,
few persons are sufficiently acquainted with the intricacies of
international copyright to understand exactly why they are for-
bidden to import into England such apparently harmless objects
as Tauchnitz novels; yet, on the whole-there are, I fear, fre-
quent exceptions-they obey. It is, I conceive, perfectly possible
to be under a moral duty to obey a command the reasons for
which are not known or understood, provided the authority of
the commanding person or body of persons is initially conceded
and acknowledged. Such is the duty of the soldier; such is the
duty of the child towards a parent's commands and prohibitions
which it often does not understand; and such is the duty which
most persons consider is owed to the powers of government.
Needless to say, if the individual denies the right of any consti-
tuted authority to order his actions, all talk of duty is idle; but
such is not the normal frame of mind of men in society.
But the instinctive habit of law-abidingness clearly will not
solve all questions. Conflicts betveen conscience and positive
law are certain to arise, whether the positive law rests upon
moral or upon more prosaic considerations. If I am given to
reflection upon fiscal policy, and do not merely pay without ques-
tion what the State demands of me, it may chance that I entirely
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approve of the duty upon tobacco. In paying it, then, I am
both obeying the authority which is set over me and following
the dictates of my own reason. But it may chance, on the other
hand, that I believe the duty on tobacco to be unjust, unwise,
and in every way reprehensible. I may then find that it is im-
possible to obey this law without violating my conscience to a
degree which is intolerable to my self-respect. Or I may say:
"I disapprove of this law, but the judgment of my conscience
is that the greater good is to obey it rather than rebel against
the forces of law and order." Which of these two courses rep-
resents the higher moral duty is, always has been, and always
will be an extremely delicate point of casuistry, and in view of
the infinitely various circumstances in which it may arise, there
can be no invariable rule for its solution. Into that vexed ques-
tion I do not enter; my point at present is simply that the very
establishment of a compulsory legal rule of conduct by competent
authority, whatever considerations, moral, economic or any
other, may have called it forth, imposes upon the individual the
necessity of choosing whether he will or will not adapt his own
particular conduct to this general rule of conduct. That is a
problem of duty, and the choice, as Lundstedt rightly but incon-
sistently points out, is a moral choice.
It will be observed that in discussing this point, to which I
must revert, I have limited myself to laws which are in the form
of commands and prohibitions and which therefore directly im-
pose duties; and I have done so because it is this kind of law
which seems to engage Lundstedt's attention almost exclusively.
But I am far fron suggesting that Austinian or Lundstedtian
commands and prohibitions make up the whole of the law, or
indeed. the larger or more characteristic part of it. There are
many laws which, as I must suggest presently, do not directly
impose duties at all.
The discussion so far has led us to this point. It is impossible
to eliminate subjective right from law, as Duguit would have
us do; it is a fortiori impossible to eliminate both subjective right
and duty from law, as Lundstedt would have us do. But it does
not follow that all parts of the law must comprise the two com-
pounded elements of right and duty; and it is the next logical
step in our inquiry to consider whether certain types of laws
may not confer rights without imposing duties, and whether





The first of these two questions I must leave on one side.
It has often been pointed out, in opposition to Austin, that many
laws are not primarily imperative at all; they merely prescribe
the means and the methods by which a person may, if he de-
sires, effect an act-in-the-law-make a will, let us say, or a con-
veyance, or pursue a remedy in the courts. These opportunities
offered by the law clearly do not possess a counterpart in duty
in the same manner as direct commands. Unable to ignore this
awkward fact, Austin escaped the difficulty by the heroic method
of denying that such enabling rules were laws "properly so
called" at all. Some modern writers, positing that every true
legal right must have a direct counterpart in duty, prefer to dis-
tinguish these legal enablements or opportunities from rights
proper, giving them the generic name of powers. Further dis-
tinctions are drawn between powers, priileges and imm mnities.2-
The subject is, in my opinion, one of the most complex in legal
analysis, and if I were to attempt to enter into it adequately,
it would take me far beyond my present limits of time and space.
I hope the omission is the more pardonable since I am concerned
on this occasion ihore particularly with duties than with rights.
I must also ask indulgence if, with a curtness which may seem
almost impertinent, I pass over one of the most controverted
questions in the whole of jurisprudence-I mean the definition of
a legal right. I touch upon this large issue only so far as is
necessary to have before us, in what follows, a consistent mean-
ing of legal right in its relation to legal duty. It is too well-
known to need further comment that of the two contending
forces which have warred over the unhappy Patroclean body of
legal right, the Greeks have adopted "power," and the Trojans
have adopted "interest," as their battle-cry. In its briefest
terms, the controversy represents on the one hand the advocacy
of individual will for its own sake, on the other hand the in-
sistence upon the material and social values of the objects to-
wards which the will is directed. For my part, I am unable to
see why these two aspects of legal right should be set in oppo-
sition to each other. On the contrary, they are both inherent
in the notion of right and are in no sense mutually exclusive.
Careful examination of the steps in his argument will, I think,
convince the reader that Ihering 21 really admitted this, but in
his anxiety to repel the exaggerations of the individualist exal-
tation of will above all else, he insisted disproportionately upon
the element of interest and laid himself open, in a manner which
I do not think represented his real view, to the charge of ignor-
ing the factor of power. The essence of legal right seems to
28 See especially HoHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEwrIONS (1923).
29 4 IHERING, GEIST DES ROMISCHEN RECHTS (1880) pt II, tit 1.
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me to be not legally guaranteed power by itself, nor legally
protected interest by itself, but the legally guaranteed power to
realize an interest. That proposition, as I have said, needs far
ampler discitssion than I can now give it; and I advance it at
this point only because, when I use the term "legal right" here-
after, I shall mean it, rightly or wrongly, in the sense which I
have suggested--viz., the legally guaranteed power to realize
an interest. Unless we attempt some such formulation, how-
ever arbitrary it may seem without fuller demonstration, we
shall inevitably be involved in the cross-purposes, which so easily
arise out of the word "right."
With these preliminary observations, I turn to the second of
the questions to which I have just referred-whether law may
impose duties without simultaneously creating rights. I hope
I need not again guard myself by saying that if I suggest that
some laws may give rise to this position, I am not conceding
Duguit's proposition that all laws do so.
The merest beginner in the study of jurisprudence knows
that Austin drew a distinction between "absolute" and "relative"
duties; 30 and we are generally warned against this dichotomy
as unsound. We need not dwell upon the relative duties-rela-
tive, that is, to specific right-claims-for they are self-explan-
atory. Of absolute duties, Austin recognized four kinds:
(1) Self-regarding duties-e.g., the duty imposed by the pro-
hibition of suicide.
(2) Duties towards persons indefinitely-e.g., "towards the
members generally of the given independent society; or towards
mankind at large."
(3) Duties not regarding persons-e.g., duties towards the
lower animals; (or, we might add, the duty imposed by a pro-
hibition of defacing some object of aesthetic, sacred or sentimen-
tal sanctity).
(4) "Where the duty is merely to be observed towards the
sovereign imposing it."
Generally discredited though it is, I submit that there is more
in Austin's distinction than has been allowed. I am unable to
see that the duties imposed by criminal law have any true
counterpart in legal right, if we employ that term in the sense
which I have ventured to postulate.
Undoubtedly, the criminal frequently, though not invariably,
infringes a private right in the course of committing the offence
with which he is charged, and therefore he has committed a
breach of duty towards an individual. So far as that individual
is concerned, the duty is "relative," and the injured person gen-
erally has a remedy to vindicate his particular right. But from
the point of view of the State, the duty is absolute: i.e., it is en-
3o AUSTIN, LscTURs (Campbell's ed. 1869) XVII, 412.
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forced not in order to implement any specific right, but to main-
tain order and security. A assaults or libels B. He has violated
B's right and B can by civil action enforce the duty of A which is
relative to that right. But if A is criminally punished, the duty
which the law vindicates is not the duty to respect the specific
right of A, but the duty not to behave in a certain manner which
is prejudicial to order and peace. In many cases, e.g., felonies,
A cannot assert his right and enforce B's duty until the criminal
law, at A's instance, has enforced B's general duty of good be-
havior.1-
Can we then say that in these circumstances a right correla-
tive to the duty resides in the State, or in society? We often
hear in political theory of the "right of the State to punish"
or of the right of society not to have its security or its suscep-
tibilities violated. "Right" in this sense has an intelligible and
an important meaning; but it is not, in my submission, the same
meaning as that of legal right properly understood. When we
speak of the right of the State or of society in this way, we
seem to be saying "it is right that the State should punish cer-
tain kinds of conduct," or "it is right that certain elements of
social life should not be disturbed;" and round these proposi-
tions much useful discussion may turn. But what is then pres-
ent to our minds is something very different from right in the
sense of power, to realize an interest. The power and the in-
terest embodied in legal right are essentially the attributes of
an individual, in his relation to other individuals. If right be
regarded as mere power, no doubt the State has the "right" to
punish anything or to order anything. It can punish a man for
31 The doubts as to this rule expressed in some of the earlier cases (see
HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE (13th ed. 1924) 338, n.2, who goes much too far
in saying that the rule "was treated as finally exploded" in Ex parte Ball,
10 Ch. D. 667 (1879) and Midland Ins. Co. v. Smith, 6 Q. B. D. 561 (1881)),
seem now to have been set at rest by Smith v. Selwyn, [1914] 3 K. B. 98.
See CLERK & Ln~nsELL, TORTS (7th ed. 1921) c.III. The exact nature of
the duty is ill-defined. In the tort cases, there is much talk of the "duty
to prosecute" for felonies; see, e.g., Smith v. Selwyn, spra, and Midland
Insurance Co. v. Smith, supra at 568; and the action in tort wil not
lie unless criminal proceedings have been instituted by the person "whose
duty it is" to prosecute; Osborn v. Gillett, L. R. 8 Ex. 88 (1873);
Appleby v. Franklin, 17 Q. B. D. 93 (1885). In Regina v. Daly, 9 C. &
P. 342, 344 (1840), Gurney, B. said: "The law does not authorize any
private person to forgo a prosecution upon any terms." This is questioned
in 1 RUSSELL, CRIMES (8th ed. 1923) 133 and 2 Ibid. 1778, and it is doubt-
ful whether there is any enforceable legal duty to prosecute, though there
is undoubtedly a right in any person to institute proceedings by way of
indictment in respect of any crime. The duty appears to be no higher than
to inform the proper authorities of the crime. "It is the duty of a man
to discover the felony of another to a magistrate." 3 INST. 140. Breach
of this duty may amount to misprision of felony. Compounding a felony
is, scilcet, an offence of a different nature.
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attempting to kill himself; quite conceivably it could in an
Oriental community punish him for not killing himself in certain
circumstances. It may well have been, and for all I know it was,
a rule of old Japanese law that it was a punishable offence not
to commit hara-kiri when one had suffered extreme disgrace.
Socrates, I suppose, would have been punishable if he had not
drunk the hemlock. And similarly, if legal right be regarded as a
mere interest or social advantage, then, in a sense which Duguit
has much exaggerated, doubtless all legal right is ultimately the
interest of the community. This is a point made by Austin. In
one sense, he observes, absolute duties-e.g., in criminal law-
"considered with reference to their mote remote purposes . . .
assuming that they are imposed at the suggestions of general
Utility . ... regard the members generally of the given political
society, or they regard mankind at large." 32 In civilized socie-
ties, there is always some kind of social purpose, more or less
explicit, behind every rule of law. But, as Austin goes on to
point out, consistently with his Benthamist beliefs, this is true,
ultimately, of all rights and duties of whatever kind. Rights in
the long run promote the general good, "although their proxi-
mate end be the advantage of the parties entitled, or the other
determinate parties for whom they are conferred in trust. For
example, the immediate purpose of a right of prdperty is either
the advantage of the proprietor himself, or of some determinate
party for whonm he is a trustee. But the ulterior or remote end
for which such rights are conferred is the advantage of the com-
munity at large. Consequently, absolute duties, the duties cor-
relating with rights, are not distinguishable when viewed from
a certain aspect. Considered in respect of their ultimate or re-
mote scope, all duties regard persons generally." 31 In other
words, the observance of legal duties is ultimately in the interest
of social peace, security and well-being.
While this is true, and indeed is truism, it is necessary, for
the sake of clear legal analysis, to distinguish the ultimate gen-
eral interest of society from the particularized, determinate
powers of individuals to realize interests; and for that reason,
the distinction between absolute and relative duties seems useful.
Absolute duties are those which are imposed by a positive rule
of law in what are believed to be the general interests of society,
but without correlation to the specific rights of any individual
or determinate number of individuals.
It seems quite unnecessary to suppose that to each one of these
duties there must correspond a determinate legal right. It is
constantly stated that because a duty is owed towards or in re-
spect of a person, that person necessarily has a right. But what




is the logical basis of this proposition? Those who assert it as
if it were self-evident 3- are unmistakably embarrassed by the
peculiar position of the lower animals. It is impossible to say
that the animal has an enforceable right not to be il-treated,5
but as it is considered necessary to fix somewhere the supposed
right in this case, it is said to reside in "the community" or "the
public." For myself, I find it impossible to form any clear con-
ception of a right owned by so vague a subject as "the commu-
nity" or "the public," and I have never yet encountered any e.x-
planation of this right which goes beyond mere loose description.
Why need we say any more than that the lawmaker, in what
he conceives to be the best interests of society, imposes a certain
duty of behavior towards animals? The moral aim of serving
"the best interests of society" is frequently and explicitly empha-
sized in the English case-law on this subject; but the "inter-
ests of society" in such a connection are manifestly of a different
nature from the "interest" which is embodied in and secured by
a legal right in the true sense. And if "the community" is too
nebulous to be conceived as the owner of a legal right, it will
hardly be contended that every individual member of the com-
munity has a separate right not to have his humanitarian in-
stincts offended. In the first place, not every member of the
community has such instincts; in the second place, when the
offender is punished, the law is not vindicating the right of any
particular individual. If you ill-treat my horse, I have an action
in tort or contract against you-it is my right which you have
violated. But if I see you ill-treating X's horse, it is true that I
may be able to set the criminal law in motion against you, 7 but
the criminal law does not exert itself in order to assuage my in-
jured feelings; it punishes the breach of an express prohibition,
which has been prompted by certain moral and social considera-
34 E.g., SAL oND, JUSmPRUDENCE (8th ed. 1930) 240: "There can be no
right -without a corresponding duty, [this is not here disputed] or duty
without a corresponding right, any more than there can be a husband with-
out a wife, or a father without a child. For every duty must be a duty
towards some person or persons, in whom, therefore, a correlative right is
vested." The "therefore" is quite undemonstrated.
3-5 But note AusTiN, op. cit. supra note 30, at 419: "The Deity, an infant,
or one of the lower animals, as being the party towards whom a dity is to
be performed, might be said to have a right. But so, in the same case,
might be an inanimate thing. To call the Deity a person, is absurd."
36 See, e.g., the leading case of Ford v. Wiley, 23 Q. B. D. 203 (1889),
where it is clear that the court was deliberately setting a higher standard
of humanity than had commended itself to at least one section of the com-
munity, viz., the farmers of Norfolk at that time.
37 may; but the right of prosecution is subject to many qualifications,
such as the discretion of justices to dismiss an information and to refuse
a warrant, the right of the Crown to enter a nolle prosequi, and the pro-
visions of various statutes under which only certain specified persons or
classes of persons may prosecute for certain offenses.
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tions connected with man's employment of sentient creatures for
his own economic interests.38 As an informant, I am merely
part of the machinery of discipline-it is said that I am even
under a duty, at least in cases of felony, to set it in motion. I
am in a totally different position from that of a plaintiff who
appeals to the law to enforce his own right.
The difference is well illustrated by the law of nuisance. A
public nuisance is a crime; he who commits it injures the gen-
eral interests of society, and in the wide, loose sense "the public"
has a "right" not to be subjected to nuisance. Yet no individual
is entitled to sue unless he can show that his own particular right
has been infringed, that he has suffered some specific, measurable
damage or inconvenience. Others who have not been damnified
to this degree have not in truth suffered any legal wrong at all,
for the mere chance or possibility of damage is not in itself
wrong unless it is so proximate and threatening that it can
be restrained by injunction. The right of the individual who
has been specifically injured is right in the true legal sense;
but the so-called right of the public to be immune from
disturbance of comfort is one to which it is difficult to attach any
precise legal significance.
The dogma that all the duties enforced by criminal law must
be correlated to rights arises from the fact, which has been
already mentioned, that very many criminal wrongs are simul-
taneously wrongs done to individual right-interests; and it is
familiar matter of legal history how slowly the notion of State
suppression of malefaction became disentangled (if it has even
yet become completely disentangled) from private retribution.
But there are nowadays many prohibitions of criminal law which
have no such manifest effect upon private right-interests as the
more obvious forms of crime, such as violence, theft and fraud.
A State, for example, compels children to go to school or to be
vaccinated, prohibits the sale of certain drugs or of alcoholic
liquors, or forbids the importation of animals which have not
first been quarantined. Where is the corresponding right?
Doubtless the moral and physical welfare of the community are
in contemplation; but can this-perhaps hypothetical-advan-
tage really be represented as a right in the public at large not
to be uneducated, or not to be smitten with smallpox, or not to
be exposed to the dangers of the drug habit, or of alcoholism, or
of rabies? It would be even more fantastic to suppose that each
38 Considerations which are very differently understood by different per-
sons; see, e.g., the two quite distinct theories which emerge from the judg-
ments in a case like In re Grove-Grady, [1929] 1 Ch. 557, the one view
purely ethical and humanitarian, the other purely materialistic and utili-
tarian. For examples, ancient and modern, of the legal restraint of
cruelty to animals, and the policy which has inspired them, see HOLLAND,
op. cit. supra note 31, at 383, n.4.
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single member of the public has a right in these respects. There
is no anomaly in saying that the State has imposed upon all per-
sons within its jurisdiction a duty which is, or is deemed to be,
in the interest of individuals generally, but in which no single
individual has such a determinate interest as can be called a
correlative right.
The State, no doubt, may have definite right-interests, in the
strict sense, similar to those of individual citizens-rights of
a very different kind from the "right to punish" or the "ight to
command" or the "right of sovereignty." It may enter into con-
tracts and other relationships which give birth to rights and
duties in the ordinary legal sense. In most countries other than
England it accepts liabilities under the law of torts. An investor
in the public funds certainly has legal rights against the State,
and the State has legal rights against him. Taxation is a some-
what anomalous case. The duty upon the taxpayer is, it is sub-
mitted, absolute. It is in no sense voluntary, as are the rights
and duties of the parties in a contract between State and sub-
ject.39 The State's "right to tax," like its "right to punish," is
of a totally different kind from a right which springs from con-
tract or tort. It is maintained by Sir John Salmond .1i that the
State's claim for taxes against its citizens consists of a large and
indefinite number of rights in persouncm-in other words, it is
a huge conglomerate of separate, ordinary money debts. Non
constat. What distinguishes the duty of paying taxes from most
absolute duties is that it is positive. Positive absolute duties
are rare by comparison with negative absolute duties, i.e., duties
to refrain from certain acts. In the case of taxation, the failure
to do what one is positively commanded to do is a criminal
offence. It is true that the taxpayer has certain rights of appeal
to the courts in order to decide whether he is liable to pay or
what he is liable to pay; and this situation is sometimes consid-
ered analogous to that which arises between two parties who dis-
pute a contract. In reality, it is very different. The State may
permit the exact nature and incidence of its command to be in-
terpreted by its tribunals-as it does, indeed, in all penal matters
-but that does not alter the fact that its demand is imperative
and imposes an absolute, irresistible duty. All contract implies
promise, but there is no element of promise here: there is sim-
39 Owing to the peculiarities of English Crown procedure the reciprocity
in contracts between State and subject is incomplete, the grant of the fiat
being a prerequisite to the remedy by Petition of Right; but since the fiat
is mere matter of machinery in all boom fide contractual claims against the
Crown, its e)xistence is not sufficient to constitute any essential difference
between these and other contracts.
40 Op. it. supra note 34, at 260. In Seaman v. Burley, [189G] 2 Q. B.




ply demand on the one side and liability on the other, subject
only to the machinery of judicial or quasi-judicial assessment.
The correlative of the taxpayer's duty is the authority of the
State over its subjects-a kind of power very different from
that right-power which, in the case of private legal rights, is
guaranteed to individuals by this same authority of the' State.
It seems, then, that all duties enforced by criminal law are of
a different kind from those imposed by civil law, inasmuch as
they do not correspond to determinate rights vested in persons
or aggregates of persons, which I believe (following Austin)
are the only true rights in law. It is, however, unnecessary to
go beyond this and enter into Austih's subdivisions of absolute
duties. For example, his so-called "self-regarding" duties do
not differ in essence from any other duties of criminal law. He
takes the examples of suicide and drunkenness. But the duties
not to kill and not to intoxicate oneself are not, in contemplation
of law, duties owed to oneself: they are duties not to disturb
public order or to shock normal sensibilities, as is well shown
by the fact that drunkenness is not a crime unless, in some de-
gree or other, it threatens the King's peace. So far as I am
aware, there is nothing in English law to punish a man for get-
ting drunk, even unto delirium tremens, in the privacy of his
own house.41 Whether or not it be otherwise in morals, in law
a duty owed to oneself is a flat contradiction. 42 Whenever the
law imposes a duty on the individual in respect of his own per-
son, liberty or property, it does so not in the interest of the in-
dividual himself (except in so far as he shares in the general
welfare of society), but in the interest of the community or of
some section of the community. Again, "duties in respect of
things or animals" fall, as we have seen, under ordinary criminal
41 A person may be convicted of being an habitual drunkard under the
Inebriates Acts (1879-1900), but only when he is already charged with a
criminal offense. At least two old Acts-the 4 JAS. I, c. 5 and the 1 CuAS.
I, c. 4-appear to impose, in very general terms, penalties for drunkenness
as such; but their main purpose is to restrain public inebriation in ale-
houses. There has been a long course of legislation on this subject, but
most of it has been directed against public scandal rather than private
vice. Before the seventeenth century, it generally took the form of giving
Justices power to suppress disorderly ale-houses or of penalizing the keep-
ers of them. These restraints were constantly evaded, and in 1627 the
system of licensing was introduced. See 4 HoLDswoTH, HISTORY OF ENG-
LISH LAw (1922-1926) 514 f.
42 "In our complex state of society, there may be few duties which are
absolutely and solely self-regardant; but such duties may be conceived.
If a ship, laden with Medford rum, be wrecked on a desert island, although
the owner be the sole survivor, and although he have no hope or chance
of rescue, it may yet be his duty not to pass his time in drinking up the
cargo." GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw (1909) 10. With
respect, it is impossible to see that the duty of sobriety in such circumr-
stances is in any sense a legal duty.
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prohibitions, except that when the things or animals are re-
garded as objects of property, the duty to compensate the owner
for injury is clearly a relative duty. Further, the case specially
disengaged by Austin, "where the duty is merely to be observed
towards the sovereign imposing it," does not seem in reality to
stand apart from other absolute duties. The example given is
that of treason; but there is no sufficient reason for detaching
this from the general body of crimes against public order. And
finally, Austin's classification of some duties as being owed
"towards the members generally of the given independent soci-
ety, or towards mankind at large" seems intended only to ex-press
the principle, already mentioned, that the observance of all abso-
lute duties ultimately enures, or is intended to enure, to the ad-
vantage of all members of society and indeed of all the human
race. Whether they do so or not of course depends upon the
degree of wisdom or unwisdom which inspired their imposition.
There is much evidence in history that the indiscriminate crea-
tion of a distracting number of absolute duties, supposed to be
of an improving tendency, does not always operate to the advan-
tage of "mankind at large."
IV
It is necessary, in view of certain growing tendencies in mod-
ern law, to draw a distinction between absolute duty and what
has come to be known in the law of tort as "absolute liability."
(Some writers, justly, as it seems to me, prefer the term "strict
liability," since the considerable exceptions to the rule make the
word "absolute" inappropriate.)
The general features of "absolute liability" for dangerous
things, especially those which are connected with the possession
of land, are too familiar to need discussion. Nor is it necessary
to mention that this form of liability is a storm-center of con-
troversy, some holding that it represents the only practicable
principle of civil liability under modern conditions, others that
"liability without fault" is inimical to the whole rationale of
civil liability. It is often said that in respect of peculiarly dan-
gerous things, there is a "duty" irrespective of negligence or
wilful aggression, to "insure" neighbors and others against dam-
age. Thus, going to the fountain-head, we read in Rylands v.
Fletcher:
"What is the obligation which the law casts on a person who,
like the defendants, lawfully brings on his land something which,
though harmless whilst it remains there, will naturally do mis-
chief if it escape out of the land? It is agreed on all hands that
he must take care to keep in that which he has brought on the
land and keeps there, in order that it may not escape and damage
his neighbours, but the question arises whether the duty which
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the law casts upon him, under such circumstances, is an abso-
lute duty to keep it in at his peril, or is ... merely a duty to
take all reasonable and prudent precautions, in order to keep it
in, but no more." 4
The use of the term "duty" is unfortunate, and is rightly at-
tacked by Lundstedt. There is, of course, a duty of careful man-
agement of any material thing, whether it belong to the family
of "Rylands v. Fletcher objects" or not; but it is difficult to see
that there is any "duty" to prevent a dangerous thing from es-
caping through causes which have nothing to do with the main-
tainer's fault; or that a common carrier is under a "duty" to
prevent articles bailed to him from being lost by theft or misad-
venture; or that a principal is under a "duty" to prevent his
agent from committing actionable wrongs within the scope of
his employment. The true situation seems to be that he who
maintains for his own advantage a peculiarly dangerous thing
in proximity to others, necessarily imposes upon those others a
risk of injury, wrongful or merely accidental, greater than is to
be reasonably expected in the ordinary circumstances of social
life; and it is therefore just and expedient that he himself should
bear the risk of making good any damage to others which re-
sults from the maintenance of the object. This is certainly a
liability, but it is a confusion of ideas to call it a duty. The true
doctrine is described more simply and, it is submitted with re-
spect, more accurately in the words which follow the passage
cited above in the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber:
"If the first [view] be the law, the person who has brought
on his land and kept there something dangerous, and failed to
keep it in, is responsible for all the natural consequences of its
escape." 4
A man may be responsible ex post facto for damage which has in
fact occurred without being under a duty ab ante to prevent
damage which is, by hypothesis, unpreventable by ordinary dili-
gence. Thus an employer may be responsible for purely acci-
dental harm which. has happened to a workman without being
under a duty to prevent it. There is, of course, a duty to pay
money by way of compensation when the damage has been es-
tablished'in fact and judgment has been delivered in law; but it
need hardly be said that this duty by matter of record is of a
different nature from the so-called "absolute duty to prevent the
damage."
Another problem of absolute duty arises with regard to sins
43 Per Curiam, in the Exchequer Chamber, sub nom. Fletcher v. Rylands,
L. R. 1 Ex. 265, 279 (1866). Italics are inserted. The passage is cited




,of ignorance. A man commits a criminal offence in ignorance
that it is unlawful: everybody knows that he is nevertheless lia-
ble to punishment. But how can it be said that he has committed
a breach of duty when he was unaware that he was ever under
the duty? Lundstedt45 appeals to this undoubted legal principle
in support of his thesis that criminal law has no connection with
moral notions, but is purelyi a matter of material expediency.
With this I cannot agree, though I think Lundstedt rightly ob-
jects to the notion that there is in these circumstances a "legal
duty" as distinct from a "moral duty," for in reality there cannot
be any duty whatever for a person who has never been made
aware that he ought or ought not to behave in a certain manner.
I am old-fashioned enough to cling to the conventional explana-
tionG that the rule ignorantia, juris qemiem exazlsat is really
based on considerations of evidence. The fact is that in the vast
majority of cases when accused persons say that they did not
knov the law, it is impossible to believe them; or at all events,
the evidence of their own mere assertion (for usually there can
be no other evidence) is too unsubstantial to be set against a pos-
itive rule of law. This is the more true when we remember how
easy it is for us all to persuade ourselves after the event (when it
is convenient to do so) that we were mistaken before the event-
a fact which is constantly illustrated in evidence concerning mis-
take and dissensus in contract. But it is objected ' that if the rule
be purely evidentiary, then supposing that it can be conclusively
proved in any particular case that the accused was in fact igno-
rant of the law, he should not be held accountable-which, how-
ever, is not the law. I do not think that this follows. In the
very rare cases where this situation may arise, the law says, and
is reasonably entitled to say: So dangerous, so subversive,
would it be to allow mere ignorance to be pleaded, that the de-
fense cannot be admitted in any circumstances, and the principle
must be preserved at all events. Such adherence to principle at
the cost of individual hardship is frequently necessary in any
system of law. Fortunately, however, the matter does not quite
end there: there is in every civilized body of law a prerogative
or discretion of pardon which exists precisely for the purpose of
mitigating intolerable individual hardship while leaving the gen-
eral principle of liability intact; and it is well known, to take a
famous example, that it was this instrument which averted what
would have been a grievous severity in the case of Rex v.
Bailey.4- This last is, so far as I know or can discover, the only
- Op. cit. supra note 16, at 36.
46See, e.g., AusTiN, op. cit. spra note 30, at XXV; and ef. Lord
Ellenborough in Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East 470, 472 (1802).
47 E.g., HOLMS, op. cit. supra note 20, at 47.
48 Russ. & Ry. 1 (1800).
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recorded English case in which ignorance of the law has been
established by the defense beyond doubt.4
V
The final phase of my topic is a brief consideration of certain
aspects of an ancient and difficult problem-the relationship be-
tween moral duties and legal duties.
The distinction usually drawn is that moral duties are those
which are enforced by the sanction of the individual conscience,
while legal duties are enforced by physical or material sanctions
imposed by extrinsic and irresistible might. This distinction,
though on the face of it deceptively plausible, is, I believe, in
essence unsound.
Duty cannot be anything but subjective and moral. Nor can
it be enforced by anything but individual conscience. When we
speak of the legal enforcement of legal duties, we mean rather
the operation of the prescribed legal penalty for non-compliance
with certain express commands or prohibitions. This extrinsi-
cally-imposed penalty for disobedience is not the same thing as
the enforcement of the duty, for to say that is to presuppose that
the sovereign command is a duty to the individual. It is not
necessarily so: that is a matter which can be determined only by
moral judgment. King Herod commands the Massacre of the
Innocents, and Mary evades the command. She might have been
put to death for her disobedience, but it could hardly be said that
her execution would have been the enforcement of her duty.
That proposition would place the determination of moral duty
entirely in the hands of the person or body of persons which has
the de facto power to enforce commands; and that is surely im-
49 Rex v. Esop, 7 C. & P. 456 (1836) (unnatural offence) and Barronet's
Case, 1 E. & B. 1 (1852) (duelling), were both cases of foreigners, who
claimed, without convincing the court (not that this could have made any
difference), that what they had done was lawful in their own countries
and that they were unaware that it was unlawful in England. In Rex
v. Crawshaw, 30 L.S.M.C. 58 (1860) (lottery), the jury did not go beyond
saying of the accused that "perhaps he did not know that he was acting
contrary to the law." Rex v. Wheat and Stocks, [1921] 2 K.B. 119, is an
interesting case. There a man of little education, who was petitioning
for a divorce under the Poor Persons Rules, convinced the jury that, on
the strength of a statement by solicitors that they could "now proceed
in the matter" and would "lose no time over your petition," he honestly
believed that he was free to marry the female accused. In holding that
there was no evidenc on which the jury could reach this finding, the
Court of Criminal Appeal seems really to have been saying that there were
insufficient grounds on which reasonable men could believe the accused's
(certainly "tall") statement.
The dicta in Burns v. Nowell, 5 Q.B.D. 444, 454 (1880), seem difficult
to reconcile with Rex v. Bailey, supra note 48, which was not considered.
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possible, whether the commanding authority be an enlightened
government or a crazy tyrant.
I am now considering such parts of the law-and, as I have
said, they are by no means the whole of the law-as directly im-
pose duties of feasance or non-feasance. Out of these commands
and prohibitions I conceive that the following moral situations
may arise for the individual who is subject to the law:
(1) His conscience approves the command; he obeys it; he
has fulfilled a duty, and his act is moral.
(2) His conscience approves the command; he disobeys it;
he has violated a duty, and his act is immoral.
(3) His conscience disapproves the command; he obeys it
merely through fear of incurring a penalty; he has violated a
duty, and his act is immoral.
(4) His conscience disapproves the command; he obeys it in
the belief that the greater good is to obey rather than rebel
against constituted authority; he has fulfilled a duty, and his act
is moral.
(5) His conscience disapproves the command; he disobeys
it in the belief that the greater good is to stand by what he con-
siders right rather than yield to authority; he has fulfilled a duty,
and his act is moral.
(6) His conscience does not critically examine the particular
command; he obeys in the belief that it is right to obey whatever
the law commands; he has fulfilled a duty, and his act is moral.
(7) His conscience does not critically examine the command;
he obeys merely through fear of penalty for disobeying anything
which the law commands; he has neither fulfilled nor violated a
duty; his act is a-moral.
(8) His conscience does not critically examine the command;
he disobeys it because, in general, he prefers his own interest
and advantage to any submission to authority; he has violated
a duty, and his act is immoral.
There will not be much dispute about cases (1), (2) and (8).
If cases (3) and (7) be correctly stated, it follows that acts
which are immoral or a-moral may be lawful and law-abiding;
and startling though this may seem on the surface, there is
really nothing in it shocking or contrary to social interest. If
case (6) be correctly stated, I so far agree with Professor'
Lundstedt as to believe that a good deal of law-abidingness is
instinctive and automatic rather than deliberate and reflective;
but I disagree with him in thinking that this forms the entire
basis and substance of lawfulness. It is case (5) which presents.
one of the most thorny problems both of law and of morals..
It seems subversive of all legal authority to say that ultimately;
the individual must decide for himself whether he ought
or ought not to obey a given law; yet there is no esape-
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from the final test of the subjective conscience. The precept of
rendering unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's cannot be,
and was never intended to be, an absolute moral rule for all cir-
cumstances; and no general duty of citizenship and orderliness
can alter the fact that it may be an imperative moral duty to
refuse obedience when obedience would mean betrayal of what is
sincerely believed to be the highest right. It follows that the law'
may sometimes have to punish what are unquestionably moral'
acts and indeed in some circumstances courageous and admirable
moral acts. History abounds with examples.
But fortunately, in well-regulated and healthy modern States,
this painful situation is comparatively rare, and, we may hope,
tends to become rarer: and this for two reasons. First, because
of the considerations suggested by case (4). It is highly improb-
able that any person alive approves morally of all the laws which
govern him; but in the great majority of such disagreements, the
clear decision of average moral judgment is that the greater good
and the higher duty are to submit to the forces of law and order
rather than disturb the peace by insisting 4 outrcnce on individ-
ual opinion. Some compromise of priuciple is recognized as
necessary on some occasions by all wise men; and there are few
who really believe it to be right and good to defy the law for
every petty dissent from its policy. Second, laws do not in fact
commonly violate normal moral sentiment. Many of them, be-
longing to that large department of law which we call common
or customary, ex hypothesi cannot do so, since there is an ele-
ment of popular practice and approval in their very genesis. As
for statutory rules, they do not commonly violate normal moral
sentiment, for the excellent reason that they dare not. The aver-
age law-abiding spirit will, as I have said, make a reasonable
compromise, but not an intolerable sacrifice, of principle. The
result of attempting to enforce commands which do not accord
with the ordinary sense of duty will only be disobedience on such
a scale that the mere terrorism of legal penalties will not effectu-
ally cope with it. If government rests upon the consent of the
governed, so does the strength of legal commands ultimately rest
upon the consent of the commanded.
The converse of this proposition is that law tends to reinforce
by commands and penalties the more elementary moral duties of
respect for the property, lives, liberty and general well-being of
others. This it does, not for the schooling of the majority of
citizens, who already observe these moral duties, but rather to
formulate more clearly the sentiment of the majority with
the object of protecting it against the ubiquitous minority which
is indifferent or hostile to such elementary dictates of ethics.
I do not deny, however, that it may often be the duty of the
law and of its officers to do more than merely echo average mo-
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rality. There are circumstances in which the law will be dis-
charging less than its true function if it does not furnish a stimu-
lus and an example to average morality. Popular opinion may, in
some communities, entirely approve the lynching of certain of-
fenders for certain offences; but it would be a strange state of
the law which sanctioned this practice. The criminal law of Eng-
land effectively stamped out what the "honor of gentlemen" ap-
proved and, indeed, demanded-the practice of duelling; and we
have seen the same process of moralization in regard to the
treatment of children, the regulation of the drink traffic, and,
more dubiously, perhaps-certainly more unscientifically-gam-
ing and wagering. Nevertheless, it is clear that the law cannot
soar too ambitiously above the morality, of common clay. If it
demands of John Styles moral standards of conduct beyond his
normal capacity, it incurs the same danger as when it violates
the more obvious promptings of his homely conscience-the
danger, namely, of disobedience and futility. Hence it is that
there are many duties recognized by the highest morality which
are not translated into legal commands.
But it is easy to speak of "average" morality and "the highest"
morality. What are they? What is the difference between them?
How does the law discern that difference? It is not easy to
describe the process with any precision; but it is one of the most
interesting attributes of the judicial office in English-speaking
countries-an attribute, I may add, which, under the influence of
sociological theories of jurisprudence, has become the envy and
the exemplar of Continental countries-that our judges have
always kept their fingers delicately but firmly upon the pulse of
the accepted morality of the day. One of the most fascinating
and most important doctrines of English common law-the doc-
trine of public policy-has, strangely enough, never been sys-
tematically and thoroughly expounded: a great opportunity
awaits the man who is prepared to study exhaustively its history
and its many social implications. He will find, as I am sure
every thoughtful student of law must have felt, innumerable ex-
amples of the process to which I have referred. It is both moral
and economic. The history of the law consists very largely of
the gradual emergence of moral and material interests which
come to be recognized as deserving and indeed demanding legal
protection. It is one of the highest attractions of the profession
of the law that its intelligent pursuit brings its practitioners into
touch with every aspect of social and private life, and that on
the whole, in the English system, it makes wise and observant
realists of the men who pass from its infinitely instructive ap-
prenticeship to the responsibilities of judicial office. We all know
how the judicial conception of the policy of the day has entirely
changed the doctrine of restraint of trade; and it is very signifi-
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cant to observe how, in the great Nordenfelt case," the majority
of the Lords quite candidly avowed that whatever the policy had
been in the past, the time had come deliberately to change it.
Only recently the President of the Probate, Divorce and Admir-
alty Division felt himself so doubtful about the traditional prin-
ciples affecting the discretion of that Court to grant a decree of
dissolution to a petitioner who had himself (or herself) been
guilty of adultery that he called in the assistance of the Attorney-
General (on behalf of the King's Proctor) to argue the whole
historical development of the matter; and I commend the case to
anybody who is interested to observe how judicial standards keep
touch with fluctuating moral sentiments. 1 Let me take one other
small example from many which might be selected. There is at
least respectable, though not very powerful, authority for the
proposition that a husband has at Common Law a right to take
possession of the person of his wife by force and to administer
moderate chastisement to her.52 But it is dead; judges nowadays
have no hesitation in saying that they would simply ignore the
right, if it ever really existed. When the question came before
the Queen's Bench in 1891, Lord Halsbury, L.C., dismissed it
in these summary words:
"Such quaint and absurd dicta as are to be found in the books
as to the right of a husband over his wife in respect of personal
chastisement are not, I think, now capable of being cited as
authorities in a court of justice in this or any civilized
country." 11
Cochrane's Case,54 a nineteenth-century authority to the con-
trary, was unequivocally overruled. This is only one incident
among many in the long history of liberal judicial policy towards
married Englishwomen. It is well illustrated also by the re-
sponse which Equity made to public opinion long before the legis-
lature could be induced to do so; and each of these incidents,
great or small, is significant; for, as Maine perceived,0 the pre-
vailing attitude towards women is one of the most symptomatic
points of difference between the "progressive" and the "unpro-
gressive" societies.
"Progressive" is, I know, a discredited word nowadays; yet
I GONordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co., Ltd.,
[1894] A. C. 535.
51 Afted v. Apted & Bliss, [1930] P. 246.
2 The authorities are collected in Regina v. Jackson, [1891] 1 Q. B. 671.
Blackstone is clear on the point, though some of the authorities which he
cites (e.g. 1 Hawk P. C. 2): seem doubtful. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMIMSNTARIES
444.
63 Regina v. Jackson, supra note 52. See also 16 HALSauRY'S LAWS op
ENGLAN6 (191), 318, n. (r).
5 8'Dowl. 630 (1840).
t5 MAINE, EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS (1888) 339 ft.
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I believe that in the history of societies we may see moral con-
victions gradually taking more and more definite shape in the
public mind, and, as they crystallize, becoming recognized as
factors in the legal system and being strengthened with the law's
coercive sanctions. Sometimes the law shows an excessive timid-
ity in taking its cue from advancing morality; for example, at
the present time I think that English law is unnecessarily reluc-
tant to restrain what sound public opinion condemns and what
many other systems have found no difficulty in forbidding-I
mean the unconscionable exercise of legal right. But in other
matters we can see the moralizing process plainly at work; and
by way of conclusion I should like to consider briefly one ex-
ample which seems to me of peculiar significance.
There is no duty more essentially moral than the altruistic
duty; indeed, to a great extent, morality is altruism. Every law-
yer will know what I mean when I say that as a general prin-
ciple our law has shown itself extremely chary of imposing altru-
istic duties. The conservative view has been that to demand of
the average man that he should sacrifice his own clear interest
to that of another is to expect of him a morality beyond his ca-
pacity and therefore to commit the injustice of addressing to him
a command which he is unable to obey. But at the present time
we may observe an increasing recognition of purely altruistic
duties in law.
VI
There are, I conceive, four principal ways in which an altru-
istic act may give rise to legal rights or duties. (1) It may be
commanded by the law as a positive duty. (2) Its altruistic
motive may be set up as a defense to an act wlich would other-
wise be illegal. (3) It may be the foundation of a claim for re-
imbursement. (4) It may be the foundation of a claim for
compensation for injury sustained in saving one person from the
consequences of the wrongful action of another.
(1) Gray has pithily observed that "the utmost to which our
neighbor has a right is that we should treat him as if we loved
him." sr Even this, perhaps, puts the matter too strongly; we
may say without cynicism that the law generally requires only
that we should treat our neighbor as if we did not hate him. It is
difficult to demand more through the instrumentality of a police-
man. And yet the results of pressing this principle to an ex-
treme are sometimes absurd, and contrary, it would seem, to a
very moderate standard of average morality. Bentham has
written:
56 GRAY, supra note 42, at 9.
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"A woman's head-dress catches fire, water is at hand: a man,
instead of assisting to quench the fire, looks on, and laughs at it.
A drunken man, falling with his face downwards into a puddle,
is in danger of suffocation: lifting his head a little on one side
would save him: another man sees this and lets him lie. A
quantity of gunpowder lies scattered about a room: a man is
going into it with a lighted candle: another knowing this, lets
him go in without warning. Who is there that in any of these
cases would think punishment misapplied?" 17
Who indeed? There is no satisfactory answer to Bentham's
question:
"In cases where the person is in danger, why should it not be
made the duty of every man to save another from mischief, when
it can be done without prejudicing himself, as well as to abstain
from bringing it on him?" 11
The distinctions sometimes drawn between self-interest and
altruistic motive are really of very little logical merit. Thus in
two recent cases it has been laid down that immediate physical
danger to oneself is a just cause for leaving employment, while
immediate physical danger to one's family is not; 51, whereas in
other branches of the law it is trite learning that peril or threat
to near kin has much the same effect as duress to oneself, 0 in
criminal law being an excuse in nearly the same degree as self-
defense and an extenuation in nearly the same degree as provoca-
tion to oneself.61 If A, a trespasser, commits, on the land of B,
what amounts to a public nuisance, B, though innocent of any
wrong, is apparently under an absolute duty to abate the nui-
sance within a reasonable time after becoming aware of its exist-
ence-at all events, he may be indicted if he does not. But if in
similar circumstances the nuisance affects only the comfort of
C, and not the public generally, then, according to a majority of
the Court of Appeal, B is under no duty to abate the nuisance
for the benefit of C; and since C has no remedy in trespass
against A, it would seem that he must endure the inconven-
ience with what equanimity he can, except that he may, of
course, resort to the dangerous dnd dubious remedy of abate-
ment.
6 2
No doubt the obstacle, in legal theory, to Bentham's desidera-
57 BENTHAM, WORKS, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1843)
148.
58 Ibid.
59Bouzourou v. Ottoman Bank, [1930] A. C. 271; Ottoman Bank v.
Chakarian, [1930] A. C. 277.
60 1 Roll. Abr. 687; Williams v. Bayley, L. R. 1 H. L. 200 (1866).
6i2 INST. c. 9, 316; 12 Rep. 87; 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 31, § 37; 3 BLACIK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES 3; 3 Salk. 46 (1822).
62 Attorney-General v. Tod Heatley, [1897] 1 Ch. 560; lob Edwards, Ltd.
v. Birmingham Navigations, [1924] 1 K. B. 341.
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tun is the difficult question of placing a precise limit to altruistic
duty. If it is to be a duty to lift the drunken man from his pud-
dle, is it to be also a duty to plunge into the deep, being a poor
swimmer, to save a drowning man? Are you, in short, to be your
brother's keeper? The man on the Clapham omnibus acts rea-
sonably, if, seeing his omnibus swaying dangerously, he "jumps
for it" and breaks his leg, though the event proves that he would
have been safe if he had kept his seat; r3 but to ask him to fling
himself in front of a charging omnibus in order to save a child
from its onslaught is to force upon him a higher righteousness
than is known or practised in Clapham. Too much may be made
of this dilemma. It ought not to be impracticably difficult to
establish by evidence when and when not the effort of rescue
may be made without unreasonable jeopardy to self, any more
than it should be impracticably difficult, in my opinion, to judge
with reasonable probability when Mr. Pickles is abstracting
underground water in the pursuit of a legitimate interest and
when he is doing it merely to hold a pistol to the heads of the
Mayor and Corporation of Bradford.04
Some limits to the snmmum ius are manifestly necessary, and
they already exist in the Common Law, though faintly and
timidly. X wrongfully creates a trap and Y, -without negligence,
is about to walk into it; Z, a disinterested third person, though
well aware of the danger, may lawfully watch Y injure or kill
himself without so much as uttering a word of warning. But
"put case," as Browning has it, that X, a workman, has, quite
legitimately, made a dangerous hole in the staircase of an un-
tenanted house; Y comes with an "order to view" the premises
from a house-agent. X is guilty of negligence if he does not
warn Y of the trap. It seems, then, that if a man has himself
created the source of danger, he is under a duty to warn any per-
son whom he sees lawfully exposing himself to that danger, al-
though he did nothing wrongful in the first instance in creating
it, and although there is no contractual relationship between him
and the person whose safety is threatened.0 3
A more positive conception of altruistic duty exists in some
branches of the criminal law, and breach of it, at all events if it
be self-imposed and "partly performed," may amount to man-
slaughter, or even murder. In Regza i,. Mrriott,"0 an old lady
of 73 was left alone, helpless, and weak in mind and body, her
sister having recently died leaving her a small property. The
6- Jones v. Boyce, 1 Stark. 493 (1816).
64 Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles, [1895] A. C. 587.
65 Kimber v. Gas Light & Coke Co., [1918] 1 K. B. 439; cf. Dominion
Natural Gas Co. v. Collins, [1909] A. C. 640; Parry v. Smith, 4 C. P. D.
325 (1879); Excelsior Wire Rope Co. N. Callan, [1930] A. C. 404; Mourton
v. Poulter, [1930] 2 K. B. 183.
66 8 C. & P. 425 (1838).
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prisoner, though not related to her, induced her, with motives
which are difficult to interpret charitably, to live in his house,
and for a time treated her with reasonable consideration and sup-
plied her with necessaries. Probably her obstinate longevity
proved irksome; at all events she was later treated with great
inhumanity and appears to have died chiefly of cold and starva-
tion. Patteson, J., although admitting that the accused owed no
duty which the old lady could actually have enforced against the
prisoner,67 directed the jury that if his conduct was deliberately
designed to produce fatal results, it amounted to murder, and
that if it was merely inhuman neglect it amounted to man-
slaughter. A somewhat lenient verdict of manslaughter was
returned.
Again, Regina. v. Instan. 1 was a case in which ingratitude met
with its just reward. The accused, a woman of full age, lived in
the same house as her aunt, an aged lady, and upon her bounty.
The aunt fell victim to a distressing.complaint which prevented
her from taking care of herself; probably it was fairly obvious
that her days were numbered, but the niece decided to hasten the
course of nature, and for ten days before the invalid's death kept
her without food, nursing or medical attendance. It was not
charged against her that she had done more than accelerate
death, but she was found guilty of manslaughter. Lord Cole-
ridge put the principle of liability upon the broadest possible
ground:
"It would not be correct to say that every moral obligation in-
volves a legal duty; but every legal duty is founded on a moral
obligation. A legal common law duty is nothing else than the
enforcing by law of that which is a moral obligation without
legal enforcement." 69
I venture to' commend these words to Professor Lundstedt,
though I fear they would only be brushed aside with contempt.
(2) There are many circumstances in which an act which
would otherwise be illegal may be justified on the ground that it
was done for the plaintiff's benefit and with motives morally
ST The words of Patteson, J., are interesting: "The cases which have
happened of this description have been generally cases of children and
servants, where the duty has been apparent. This is not such a case;
but it will be for you to say whether, from the way in which the prisoner
treated her, he had not by way of contract, in some way or other, taken
upon him the performance of that duty which she, from age and infirmity,
was incapable of doing . . . This is the evidence on which you are called
on to infer that the prisoner undertook to provide the deceased with
necessaries; and though, if he broke that contract, he might not be liable
to be indicted during her life, yet, if by his neglect her death was
occasioned, then he becomes criminally responsible." 8 C. & P. at 433 (1838).




good and charitable. It is inconceivable that it should be an
actionable assault to hold and bind a person who, in an epileptic
fit or other derangement, is likely to do himself or others a mis-
chief,70 though I know of no decision directly on the point. It is
a favorite problem of the text-books whether the surgeon who
performs an operationi upon an unconscious patient has com-
mitted a trespass; there is no decision; but no lawyer seriously
doubts that the act is justified if done under reasonable necessity
and a bona fide desire to save life or to prevent suffering.- Some
of the old cases show that a charitable motive was early recog-
nized as a defense even in the extremely delicate matter of in-
terfering between husband and wife; a man might, for example,
intermeddle with feme when she was in jeopardy of her life from
baron, and might carry her to a Justice of the Peace; 72- he might
even intervene, it would seem, "where the feme would kill her-
self." 7.
Trespass to land may undobutedly be justified if committed for
the purpose of saving life or property. The question has most
often arisen in connection with entry to prevent or extinguish
fire. As late as 1893,7" the Court of Queen's Bench was not pre-
70 "A man may imprison another to prevent apparent mischief which
may ensue." Vin. Abr., tit. Trespass (E. a), XX, 487. A good many
of the cases cited seem to be simple cases of intervention to prevent a
breach of the peace; concerning this, scilicet, there is no doubt.
In Anon., Y. B. Hil. 22 Edw. IV, p1. 9 & 10, cited Br. Abr. tit. Faux
Imprisonment, p1. 28, "the plaintiff brought an action of false imprison-
ment against the defendant, the servant of one J. Fortescue, Esq., who
had a commission from the King to seize the plaintiff on the ground that
he was a Scot and an enemy to the King. The same plaintiff brought
another action against the same defeffdant for the imprisonment of his
wife. The defendant pleaded that he met the woman on the high road
and told her that her husband had been imprisoned as a Scot, whereupon
her behaviour was such that it seemed that she was mad like one that
is a lunatic, and that the defendant, to avoid the mischief that might
ensue, took her and imprisoned her in his house for the space of one hour.
Fairfax, J., said: 'That is no plea, for you would have the jury try whether
you thought, or whether it seemed to you, that she was mad as a lunatic,
and that cannot be; you ought to have alleged that she was in fact mad,
and that she would have killed herself or done other mischief, as to set
fire to a house .. . and therefore you shall understand that you should
allege that she was mad in fact and that you were in dread that she
would do you some mischief, wherefore you took her and imprisoned her
in your house." Per Phillimore, J., Cope v. Sharpe (No. 2), [1911] 2
K. B. 837, 843. The doubt was as to the evidence; but it seems to have
been assumed that if the woman was in fact dangerous, the imprisonment
was justified.
71 See PoLLoCK, ToRTs (13th ed. 1929) 175.
72Y. B. 12 Hen. I, 37, cited Br. Abr., tit. Trespass, p1. 207; Vin. Abr.,
tit. Trespass L. 3.
73 Y. B. 20 Hen. VII, 2, cited Br. Abr., ibid. pl. 440; Vin. Abr., ibid.
74 Carter v. Thomas, [1893) 1 Q. B. 673. Note the cautious dictum of
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pared to say categorically that such a motive would excuse tres-
pass, though actually on the older authorities, which in the par-
ticul~r circumstances it was not necessary to cite to the Court,
there seems to be little doubt about the matter.7 5 In 1912, in
Cope v. Sa-pp7 the principle was laid down that the true justi-
fication for entry to combat fire is not the actual necessity as
proved by the event, but what seems, in the emergency, to be
necessity in the view of a reasonable man. It is true that in
this case the defendant (through his servant) was protecting his
own interests-viz, sporting rights-and not the interests of
another; but there is no reason to think that the same principle
would not be applied to intervention on behalf of a third person;
and the true doctrine seems to have been expressed (in another
connection) in the following words:
"When by the force of circumstances a man has the duty cast
upon him of taking some action for another, and under that obli-
gation, adopts the course which, to the judgment of a wise and
prudent man, is apparently the best for the interest of the per-
sons for whom he acts in a given emergency, it may properly be
said of the course so taken, that it was, in a mercantile sense,
necessary to take it." 77
If altruism was among the few defenses to trespass, a tort
very difficult to justify in the old law, a fortiori it might be set
up in certain forms of action on the case. It is unnecessary to
insist that the "social and moral duty" pleaded in cases like
Stuart v. Bell 78 is purely altruistic, or that a genuine charitable
motive may excuse what would otherwise be maintenance.
In contract, it cannot very often be in issue whether breach is
justified by an urgent duty owed to a third person; but the ques-
tion has come before the courts in at least one important connec-
tion. It was for long unsettled whether "the usual perils of the
sea," within the terms of a charter-party, would include a loss
incurred through going to the rescue of a ship in distress. In
1880, it was held that a loss so incurred is covered by the terms
of the contract, but only when the deviation is made in order to
save life, not property.7 9 The point is interesting: under our
severe doctrine of "subsequent impossibility," the urgency or ir-
Kennedy, J., at 678, and compare it with the judgment of the same learned
judge, then Kennedy, L. J., in Cope v. Sharpe (No. 2), supra note 70.
7 Y. B. 9 Edw. IV, 35.b, cited Br. Abr., ibid. pl. 186, Vin. Abr., ibid. I.
a. 10; Y. B. 21 Hen. VII, 27, Br. Abr., ibid. pl. 213, Vin. Abr., ibid. K.a.3.
76 [1912] 1 K. B. 496.
77 Australasian Steam Navigation Co. v. Morse, L. R. 4 P. C. 222, 230
(1872). The point at issue, however, was purely one of commercial law,
Cf. Maleverer v. Spinke, Dyer 35b (1537); Dewey v. White, Moo. & M. 56
(1827).
78 [1891] 2 Q.B.341.
79 Scaramanga v. Stamp, 5 C. P. D. 295 (1880).
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resistibility of the interrupting cause is irrelevant; it could
hardly be said that this risk was "impliedly in the contemplation
of the parties," for in the case under consideration one of them
expressly repudiated it; and the judgment of the majority 81 rests
solely upon the imperative moral duty of saving human life when
in peril.81
(3) Solely in the interest of B, and believing himself to be
under a duty to confer the benefit, A performs an unrequested
service for B; has A any claim to be recompensed by the bene-
ficiary? Doubtless the act ceases to be altruistic in the highest
sense when a reward is sbught for it; but supposing-since hu-
man nature is usually actuated by mixed motives-that the bene-
factor feels that in justice his good offices should, at the very
least, not leave him in a worse position than before, is the duty
which he has discharged one of a kind which the law will recog-
nize as requiring recompense?
In maritime law, the answer is in no doubt. The law of salvage
is very ancient and extremely widespread.2- The perils of the
sea have always been so many and so imminent that the most
elementary instincts of humanity have dictated the duty of ren-
dering assistance to combat them; though it may well be that the
earliest form of salvage was of a less idealistic kind-it was per-
haps a reward and an encouragement to the salvor for his vir-
tuous self-restraint in not committing depredations upon the
shipwrecked and the helpless.83 Now the English law of salvage
exhibits a curious jumble of altruistic and of self-regarding prin-
ciples; from what is called a "psychological" point of view I do
not know any branch of English law which is more interesting.
One of its most firmly-established doctrines is that no claim for
salvage lies merely for saving life; primarily the claim is for sav-
ing property harmless to its owner.84 The altruistic moral duty of
saving life is not considered one which deserves material reward;
nor is the salvor recompensed for any courage or enterprise
which he may have shown or any hardship which he may have
endured, unless he has actually been successful in saving valuable
property. 5 Indeed the master of a vessel is under a statutory
duty (which, however, does not exclude a claim for salvage) to go
to the assistance of another vessel in distress for the sake of say-
SO Bramwell, L. J., though agreeing in the result, based his reasoning
on a narrower ground.
s8 See especially Cockburn, C. J., 5 C. P. D. at 304.
82See ASHBURNER, THE RHODIAN SEA LAW (1909) ccLm'mxiii if.; ABBOrr,
SHIPPING (1822) pt. V, c. III; The Gas Float Whitton (No. 2), [1890] P.
42.
83 See AsHBuRNm, op. cit. supra note 82.
84 The Renpor, 8 P. D. 115 (1883).




ing life; but that duty is limited by the principle that he is not
bound to go to the rescue if in so doing he would expose his own
ship and its passengers and crew to an excessive risk. It is some-
times a matter of great nicety to decide between the extremity
of others and the danger to the salvor's own vessel; and if he,
believing his first duty to lie towards the imperilled ship, should
be proved by the event to have been mistaken, he cannot recover
for any damage which he himself may have suffered in doing
what he honestly believed to be his legal as well as his moral
duty. 6 Again, it is clearly settled that the service performed,
if it is to be the basis of a claim for salvage, must be definitely
in the interest of another; and therefore nobody who himself
benefits from salvage-such as an insurer or a passenger-has
any claim for reward save in exceptional circumstances which
need not be described in detail.87
But all this complex law, so active afloat, disappears ashore.
Why English law never developed any law of salvage for dry
land and the things upon it is by no means clear to me: I sus-
pect the reason to be that while our law absorbed the foreign
law merchant, with its doctrine of salvage, it never assimilated
the foreign system which contained the doctrine of negotiorum
ge.tio; though why it could not have developed a law of its own
analogous to negotiorum gestio I do not profess to understand
and, not having specially inquired into the historical reasons (if
there be any, except mere chance), I venture no opinion-
Whatever the reason, it is certain that "there is no case in any
English Court in which the question of salvage reward has ever
been entertained unless the subject of the salvage service was a
ship, her apparel, or cargo, or freight, which is peculiar to ships,
or wreck of a ship or her cargo, or, by statute, the life of a per-
son in danger, because the person has been on board the ship." 81
There is no law of iegotiorum gestio upon the soil of England-
no claim for services rendered unless there was, at the time of
rendering them, some promise, express or implied, on the part
s See The Melanie v. The San Onofre, supra note 85. It is an indictable
offence to impede the saving of life from shipwreck (see STEPHEN, DIGEST
OF CRimiNAL LAW (7th ed. 1926) art. 330 (j)), or for a master of a ship.
not to wait to save life in a collision, or not to render assistance to persons
who are in danger at sea (ibid. art. 556).
87 The Neptune, 1 Hagg. Adm. 227, 236 (1824) ; Crouan v. Stanier, [1904]
1 K. B. 87; Newman v. Walters, 3 Bos. & P. 612 (1804).
88 The explanation of Bowen, L. J., is sufficiently vague: "The maritime
law for the purposes of public policy, and for the advantage of trade,
imposes in these cases a liability upon the thing saved, a liability which is
a special consequence arising out of the character of mercantile enter-
prises, the nature of sea perils, and the fact that the thing saved was
saved under great stress and exceptional circumstances." Falcke v. Scottish
Imperial Insurance Co., 34 Ch. D., 248 (1886).
so Per Lord Esher, M. R., The Gas Float Whitton (No. 2), supr note 82.
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of the person who took the benefit, to pay for them. They are, in
the curt words of Fry, L.J.,°° "a mere impertinence." "If work
is done," said Martin, B., 91 "and there is no bargain for payment,
either express or to be implied from such circumstances as show
an understanding on both sides that payment shall be made, an
action cannot be maintained for remuneration merely because it
may appear to be reasonable." Are we to see in this dislike of
unsought indebtedness a certain characteristic independence of
the Anglo-Saxon temperament? Perhaps so; at all events, the
principle has been insisted upon rigidly. According to a well-
known decision, 92 a man cannot even claim reward for services
which he has performed under a promise to be given "such re-
muneration as shall be deemed right." If certain old decisions
still have authority, it would seem that the finder and preserver
of a dog has no claim to recompense from its owner, nor even a
lien for the animal's keep; 13 and what applies to a dog appears
to apply generally to all creatures and all articles found and kept
for the benefit of their owners 4 At one period in the nineteenth
century an attempt was being made to establish a principle that
one who paid the premiums on an insurance policy on behalf of
the insured, in order to preserve the property, was entitled to re-
imbursement and had a right of priority over incumbrancers of
the policy; but a decisive quietus was given to the doctrine in
Faicke v. Scottish Imperial Insurance CoY5
If it amuses us to speculate as to the psychological bases of
the law, we may find two possible, and antithetic, explanations
of the English rejection of negotiorun gestio. The idealist may
see in it an assertion of the lofty principle that the virtuous act
should be its own reward: and, as we have seen, this notion does
seem to be implicit in the maritime rule that salvage cannot be
claimed for saving human life. The cynic, on the other hand,
may see in our rule a suggestion that if a man chooses to give
rather than to sell his services, the more fool he. Some support
might be found for the latter view in the implication which seems
to lie behind the Common Law doctrine of consideration, and
perhaps also behind Equity's distrust of the "mere volunteer,"
viz., that a sensible man does not give something for nothing.
But it is probably unsafe to read too many speculative refine-
90 Re Leslie, 23 Ch. D. 552, 561 (1883).
91 Reeve v. Reeve, 1 F. & F. 280 (1858). Cf. note to Lampleigh v.
Braithwaite in 1 SunaH, LFADING CASES (13th ed.) 156.
92 Taylor v. Brewer, 1 M. & S. 290 (1813).
93 Binstead v. Buck, 2 W. BI. 1117 (1776).
94 Nicholson v. Chapman, 2 H. Bl. 254 (1793).
95 34 Ch. D. 234 (1886). The authorities are exhaustively examined by
Cotton, L. J. Hard cases may undoubtedly result from the principles laid
down in this case and by Fry, L. J., in Re Leslie, mpra note 90. See Re
Winchilsea, 39 Ch. D. 168 (1888).
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ments into a doctrine which may have a much simpler historical
explanation. What is clear is that the harsh repudiation of the
very reasonable principle of negotiorm gestio cannot operate
without considerable exceptions. There is, for example, one
somewhat vague form of quasi-contract which is difficult to rec-
oncile with it: I mean the action for "money paid to the use of
the defendant." Though this action undoubtedly exists, it is not
easy to state with precision in what circumstances it will lie. It
is usually stated that a plaintiff may recover in this form of ac-
tion when he- "has been compelled, under threat or reasonable
apprehension of legal proceedings or legal restraint of goods, to.
pay a sum of money or do any other act which another person
is primarily liable to pay or perform;" ", but sometimes the lia-
bility is placed upon very much broader grounds of natural jus-
tice than reimbursement of money paid under actual compul-
sion9 7 In my'humble opinion, the basis of this action has not yet
been thoroughly and satisfactorily considered, historically or
analytically, and it would form a valuable subject for some en-
terprising student's investigation, for it is of much interest both
theoretically and practically.
Nor, again, is it easy to define the circumstances in which A
will have an equitable lien for money expended on the goods of
B, and here, too, historical analysis would be valuable2 -
The law of trusts recognizes a limited kind of negotiorum
gestio in the familiar principle that a trustee who has properly
and reasonably paid moneys out of pocket for the preservation
of the trust property is entitled to be reimbursed out of the
9 6 JENKS, DIGEST OF ENGLISH CML LAw (1908) par. 709, citing Duncan
v. Benson, 3 Ex. 644 (1847); Roberts v. Crowe, L. R. 7 C. P. 629, 637
(1872); Edmunds v. Wallingford, 14 Q. B. D. 811, 814 (1885); Tubbs
v. Wynne, [1897] 1 Q. B. 74; to which add Exall v. Partridge, 8 T. R.
308 (1799).
97 E.g. by Brett, M. R., in Leigh v. Dickeson, 15 Q. B. D. 60, 64 (1884):
"Money has been expended for the benefit of another person under such
circumstances that an option is allowed to him to adopt or decline the
benefit: in this case, if he exercises his option to adopt the benefit, he
will be liable to repay the money expended; but if he declines the benefit
he will not be liable'" Cf. Roberts v. Champion, 5 L. J. 0. S. 44 (K. B.
1826) ; and contrast Aktieselskabet Dampskibs Steinstad v. Pearson, 137
L. T. 533 (1927). See LEAKE, CONTRACTS (7th ed. 1921) 44: "A debt
for money paid arises where a person has paid money for another under
circumstances and upon occasions which make it just and equitable that
it should be repaid; a debt or promise to pay is then implied in law, with-
out any actual agreement to that effect" (citing Maxwell v. Jameson,
2 B. & Ald. 51 (1818) ; Adams v. Dansey, 8 L. J. 0. S. 165 (C. P. 1880);
Lewis v. Campbell, 19 L. J. 130 (C. P. 1842), per Maule, J.
98 Contrast, e.g., Jones v. Cliff, 5 C. & P. 560 (1833); Unity Joint-
Stock Mutual Banking Association v. King, 25 Beav. 72 (1858); and'
Millard v. Harvey, 34 Beav. 237 (1864).
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•estate 99 or by the cestui que trust if sui juris,'" and to retain a
lien on the trust property for such reimbursement 11 This is
the most elementary justice in the case of a person who under-
takes onerous duties and liabilities on behalf of another, fre-
quently without renumeration of any kind. The same principle
necessarily applies to the executor,10 -' and there is some authority
for holding that even an executor de son tort is, in similar cir-
cumstances, entitled to some measure of protection; for although
-he cannot claim for moneys paid in the course of his -wrongful
administration, it seems that he may plead such payments in
mitigation of damages in an action of trover or trespass brought
by the rightful executor or administator.Y1 3
Another type of qua.&-negotlorono gestio is to be found in
maritime law, in the principle of general average, according to
which one of several co-adventurers who has made a sacrifice
of his own particular interest in a manner which accrues to the
interest of all is entitled to share the contribution with the others
-who have benefited. This, like salvage, is a very ancient institu-
tion of the sea; 10- but it differs from true gegotiorurn gestio in
that the claimant recovers for a sacrifice made in an interest
which is not entirely another's but is partly his own.
(4) The last aspect of altruistic duty in law is perhaps the
most interesting, because here we can see the clearest evi-
dence of the gradual development-as yet incomplete-of a
new legal conception. The cases to which I am about to refer could
not, I believe, conceivably have been decided a hundred years
ago in the way in which they have been decided within recent
times. It is not too much to say that throughout the latter half
of the nineteenth century, and throughout the twentieth centurT
so far as it has gone, there is to be observed a growing recogni-
tion of a moral principle commended by Cockburn, C.J., in a
case which I have already mentioned-a case plhinzac impres-
sionis which laid down that deviation in the course of a voyage
in order to save life is an excuse for apparent breach of the terms
of a charterparty:
"The impulsive desire to save human life when in peril is one
of the most beneficial instincts of humanity ... It is of the ut-
most importance that the promptings of humanity in this respect
99 Trustee Act, 1925, S. 30 (2).
o Balsh v. Hyham, 2 P. Wms. 453 (1728) ; Hardoon v. Belilios, [1901]
. C. 118.
1o Re Leslie, supra note 90. In re Jewell's Settlement, [1919] 2 Ch. D.
161.
102 Trustee Act, 1925, S. 30 (2).
303 2 BLACKSTONE, COMBIENTARIES 508; WILLIAMS, EXEcUTORs (11th ed.
1921) 187, and authorities there cited.
104 ASHBURNER, op. cit. supra note 82, at ccli; ABBOTT, op cit, supra note
82, at pt. III, c. VIII.
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should not be checked or interfered with by prudential consider-
tions as to injurious consequences." 'o0
When a man obeys this "impulsive desire to save human life,"
and is injured in so doing, is his act to be regarded, in a legal
point of view, as one of supererogation for which his only re-
ward is the mens sibi conscia recti, or will the law impute liabil-
ity for his injury to the person who in the first instance exposed
human life to danger? It is clear that the rescuer has no claim
against the person whom he has saved, or attempted to save,
from harm; but there is a growing body of case-law in Anglo-
American jurisprudence which gives approval and encourage-
ment to the performance of this high altruistic duty.
One Scots decision of 1886 ,0 left this question open as a mat-
ter of legal principle, though the result of the case, on the find-
ings of fact by the jury, was that a young woman who was killed
while endeavoring to drag her companion out of danger from
a negligently driven train was not guilty of contributory negli-
gence. When in 1897,.in Wilkinson v. Kinneil,10 the issue was
raised nakedly it was held by a majority of four judges to three
that a boy who was injured in attempting to save a fellow-work-
man from a runaway wagon was not disentitled by contributory
negligence from claiming damages from his employers.108
A consistent group of American decisions in different states
is to the same effect. In Eckert v. Long Island R.R.,1°D damages
were recovered by the executor of a person who was killed in the
attempt to save a child from a negligently-driven train. The
facts of Ridley v. Mobile R.R. 10 were very similar, and the deci-
sion the same. So, too, in Pennsylvania R.R. v. Roney,"' where
an engine-driver was killed in a collision, when instead of jump-
ing from his train and thereby probably saving himself, he stood
105 Scaramanga v. Stamp, supra note 79.
106 Woods v. Caledonian Ry., 23 Scot. L. R. 798 (1886).
307 24 R. 1001 (Ct. of Sess. 1897).
108 These cases are discussed in 1 BEVEN, NEGLIGENCE (4th ed. 1928>
176 ff. Beven's own view (with which his latest editors disagree) ig
summed up in these words: "To entitle one to relief from the consequences
of another's negligence, it is by no means necessary that the injured party
should have been at the time of receiving the injury in the discharge of
any duty whatever. His rights in this respect are perfect when he is in
the performance of any lawful act; and an attempt to save life endangered
by the negligence of another whether obligatory as a duty or not is cer-
tainly in itself a thing lawful; while the wrongdoer is liable for the results
of his negligence . . . The defendants have not done their duty; else
there had been no emergency; how can they be allowed to escape liability
by alleging that one in the performance of the 'plainest and highest duty'
had been injured in his instinctive effort to neutralise their default?"
10943 N. Y. 502 (1871).
110 114 Tenn. 727, 86 S. W. 606 (1905).
111 89 Ind. 453 (1872).
[Vol. 40
LEGAL DUTIES
at his post in order to try to stop the train and save the pas-
sengers.-2 Similarly it has been held that a defendant who neg-
ligently leaves an opening in a bridge, so that a child falls into
the streamis liable in damages to the parent who plunges to the
child's rescue; -3 and, on the same principle as the Scots case
just mentioned, that the widow of a workman who has been killed
while attempting to rescue a fellow-workman from a source of
danger (a "cave-in"!) negligently caused is entitled to dam-
ages."4 Perhaps the most striking of this line of cases is Wag-
ner v. Interatianol R.R."- The plaintiff and his cousin were
passengers in the defendant railway. They were standing up,
the car being greatly overcrowded. The doors were negligently
left open, and at a point where the train oscillated, the plaintiff's
cousin was thrown out upon a bridge. An alarm was given but
the train did not stop until it had crossed the bridge. The plain-
tiff went back in the darkness over the bridge looking for the
body of his cousin. While walking on the trestles, he fell and was
injured. He was held entitled to recover damages, Cardozo, .T.,
saying:
"Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons
to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind
in tracing conduct to its consequences. It recognizes them as
normal. It places their effects within the range of the natural
and probable. The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the
imperilled victim; it is a wrong also to the rescuer... The risk
of rescue, if only it be not wanton, is born of the occasion. The
emergency begets the man. The wrongdoer may not have fore-
seen the coming of a deliverer. He is accountable as if he
had." -16
In England, there is only one case similar to these American
decisions, and it is comparatively recent. In Brandon v. Osborne
Garrett, 1the plaintiff's husband, while in a shop as a customer,
was injured by a piece of glass which was allowed to fall by the
negligence of contractors who were repairing the roof. The
12 ]Both the last two cases are cited by STmmr, FOUNDATIONS oF LEGAL
LiABILIY (1906) 133, who also cites: Donahoe v. Wabash R. R., 83
Mo. 560 (1884); Spooner v. Delaware R. R., 115 N. Y. 22, 21 N. E. 696
(1889); Pennsylvania R. R. v. Langendorf, 48 Ohio St. 316 (1891);
Cottrill v. Chicago R. R., 47 Wis. 634, 3 N. W. 376 (1879). See: also
Alabama Power Co. v. Conine, 213 Ala, 228, 104 So. 535 (1925), and
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Johnson, 115 So. 168 Ala. (1927). In some
jurisdictions the principle has even been e.xtended to risk incurred in
saving the property of another from harm. See e.g., Atlantic Coast Line
R. R. v. Wildman, 29 Ga. App. 745, 116 S. E. 858 (1923).
"M Gibney v. State of New York, 137 N. Y. 1, 33 N. E. 141 (1893).
"4 Matter of Waters v. Taylor Co., 218 N. Y. 248, 112 N, E. 127 (1916).
15 232 N. Y. 176, 133 N. E. 437 (1921).
116 Ibid. 180, 133 N. E. at 437, 438.
"17 [1924] 1 K. B. 548.
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plaintiff was not touched by the glass, but believing, as she had
every reason to do, that her husband was in serious danger, she
clutched him and tried to pull him out of harm's way. In so do-
ing she strained her leg and caused the recurrence of an old
thrombosis. Swift, J., had no difficulty in adopting the reasoning
of some of the American cases to which I have adverted or in
basing himself on the principle of Cockburn, C.J.:
"I do not say that there is a legal duty to risk one's own life
to save that of a stranger; indeed, I should unhesitatingly say
there was not, but there may be a nearer approach to such a duty
to save the life of one's child or wife or husband. In any event
there may be a moral obligation which would so uct upon the
mind of any ordinary reasonable man that he would instinctively
rush to the assistance of one in immediate peril through the neg-
ligent act of a third party. If he were injured by that negligent
act of the third party and sued him, I think the real question
would be for the jury to decide, and that question would be-was
the plaintiff in all the circumstances guilty of contributory neg-
ligence?" I'8
In this growing doctrine of the Common Law, then, we may
see a recognition of the fact-which, as I have said, a hundred
years ago would probably not have been admitted as a circum-
stance which the law could safely assume-that, at least where
human life is at stake, the impulse to purely altruistic conduct
is part of the morality of the average man. Although this kind
of conduct is not likely to be actually enforced by any system of
law in an imperfect world, since it involves the extreme self-
sacrifice than which, we are taught, no man hath greater love,
it seems not at all improbable that some day the law may impera-
tively require of human nature at least that minimum of altruism
which Bentham, and most sensible persons with him, considered
not in excess of the plain man's plain duty.
118 Ibid. This was the view adopted in Woods v. Caledonian Ry., sllp'a
note 106.
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